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PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION
FRANK J. WHALEN, JR.*
N  THE PAST six terms of the Supreme Court punishment for
crime has received little treatment. Only fifteen cases have
been fully considered.: Several conclusions can be drawn. Per-
haps the federal and state legislatures, the judiciary, and the prose-
cuting and correction officers have learned to act within the con-
fines of constitutional provisions to which time has at last given
content. Or perhaps the pressure of other business has compelled
the Court to leave questions with such narrow impact (sometimes
upon a single individual only) to the inferior courts. .It may be
that counsel have failed to present important constitutional issues
in the sharpest relief. Perhaps the truth is this prosaic: the usual
criminal defendant who has capable counsel is not put into a position
where the punishment imposed is violative of the Federal Con-
stitution; and those who are not well represented (or are with-
out counsel at all) either never become aware of the violation, or
awareness comes at such a late stage that the objection is lost.
Yet, the few cases do show that the portions of the Constitution
applicable to punishment are still effectual. 2
We have in our Constitution certain provisions relating pri-
marily to punishment and other more general limitations channel-
izing the whole governmental process. Some of these provisions
*Member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars.
1. Ten cases involved constitutional issues. The other five concerned
interpretation of federal statutes.
2. After long disuse, the bill of attainder provision was revived in
United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
Electrocution stood approved for sixty years, only to be the subject of the
celebrated case of Willie Francis, involving mechanical failure, 329 U. S,
459 (1947).
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restrict only the Federal Government; others apply to the States.3
This paper has the modest aim of indicating, in a broad way, the
past application of them to. punishment for crime, and of inter-
relating the constitutional doctrines thus developed.
Certain technical matters are beyond the scope of this un-
dertaking. For example, the determination of whether a crime is
"infamous" so that the defendant has a constitutional right in
federal courts to trial by jury and indictment or presentment by
a grand jury depends largely on the possible punishment.4 Such
requirement relates more to criminal procedure, and therefore
is not treated. So also, certain provisions, such as double jeopardy,
due process, and equal protection, with direct relevance to pun-
ishment, have other important functions, which are not developed
here.
In this area as elsewhere in constitutional law, there has been
a long struggle to delineate those notions contained in the Bill
of Rights which the general guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-due process, equal protection, and privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States--comprehend. 5 The decisions
of the nation's highest court have been so few and even dicta so
rare, that it would take a bold prognosticator indeed to predict
3. Directly applicable to the Federal Government only: (1) double
jeopardy, Amend. V; (2) cruel and unusual punishments, and excessive fines,
Amend. VIII.
Directly applicable to both Federal and State Governments: (1) bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws; Art. 1, §§ 9, 10; (2) due process of law,
Amend. V. and XIV.
Directly applicable to the States only: (1) equal protection of the laws,
Amend. XIV.
4. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885) ; Schick v. United States,
195 U. S. 65 (1904) ; and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
(1937).
5. Amendments I-VIII (the so-called Bill of Rights) restrict only the
Federal Government. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833), fol-
lowed in: Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475 (U.S. 1867) ; In re
Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890) ; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892) ;
Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502 (1915), as to allegedly cruel and unusual
punishments; and in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), as to
alleged double jeopardy.
The protections of Amendments I-VIII are not included within the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, except so far as such rights pertain to federal
citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873), followed in
In re Kemmler, supra, as to allegedly cruel and unusual punishments. Nor is
"due process of law" of the Fourteenth Amendment shorthand for Amend-
ments 1-VIII. it re Kemmler, supra, but compare Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947) ; Palko v. Connecticut, supra, applying
a natural law interpretation of "due process" as to allegedly cruel and un-
usual punishments, and double jeopardy.
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U. S. 25 (1949), indicate continued uncertainty.
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the result in any but an extreme situation. An attempt has been
made here to indicate how far the inhibition of the States has
progressed. Suffice it to say now that such expansion is very slight.
Thus far the Court has considered itself a poor geometer of the
proper balance between the interests of society in retribution, refor-
mation, deterrence, and elimination of offenders, and the interests
of the convicted criminal.
Most of all, it should be remembered that, unlike the victim
of a forced confession, the complainant against punishment for
crime seldom stands before legislature or court in a sympathetic
light; for he is a criminal, convicted by orderly process of lam
I. CRUEL, UNUSUAL, AND EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENTS
The only general provision in the Federal Constitution, speci-
fically affecting punishment, is embodied in the Eighth Amendment:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."8
This provision has a clearly traceable lineage, although it is of
no great antiquity.7
In England during the revolutionary struggles of the Tudor
and Stuart reigns there had been great atrocities. Incarcerations
had been drawn out for long, indefinite periods for failure to fur-
nish exorbitant bail, or to pay enormous fines; and punishments
of extreme ferocity had been imposed.8 As a consequence Parli-
ment, after the accession of William and Mary, included in the
Bill of Rights, in 1689, a provision that
6. Proposed by Congress, September 25, 1789; ratified by three-fourths
of the states, as required, December 15, 1791. Art. I, Sec. 3, limits the effect
of impeachment; Art. III, Sec. 3, limits the effect of attainder of treason.
7. Compare Double Jeopardy and Due Process of Law, infra. Limita-
tions on fines for felonies (i.e., feudal offenses) were stated in Magna Carta
c. 20; amercements were to save the freeman his contenement; to the
merchant, his merchandise; and to the villein, his wainage. Cooley, Constitu-
tional Limitations 329 (1868); McKechnie, Magna Carta 284-293 (2d ed.
1914).
8. Typical in the time of James II was the sentence of Titus Oates for
perjury: (among other punishments) to stand at the pillory at divers times
and places, and to be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate, and Newgate to
Tyburn, on successive days, and to be imprisoned for life. 10 Howell's State
Trials 1079, 1317. Oates was relieved of the balance of the sentence by royal
pardon in 1689. William, Earl of Devonshire, was fined 30.000c and com-
mitted for failure to pay. This was likewise set aside in 1689. 11 Howell's
State Trials 1362. 6 Holdsworth, History of English Law 214-215 (3rd ed.
1922).
Complaints on the same score were part of the reason for the demise of
the Star Chamber in 1641. 11 Howell's States Trials 1362; Cooley, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 342-343. 1 Holdsworth, op. cit. mtpra at 505-506, is less
severe, pointing out that large fines were often reduced by the Star Chamber,
and statutory punishments in common law courts were as oppressive.
1951)
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"excessive bail ought not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."9
Thus, the language of the English constitutional provision was
borrowed verbatim, save for the substitution of the hopeful "shall
not" for the rore candid "ought not."' 0
(1) Cruel Punishment
Aside from the matter of excessive bail" it is apparent that
the constitutional guaranty is directed at two elements in punish-
ment: first, how it is inflicted; and secondly, how much is imposed.
Although there had been one previous decision, the first serious
consideration in the Supreme Court came in 1878.1" The procedural
impediments to review of federal criminal cases13 precluded until
that late date the raising of such an issue to the highest appellate
level. The cause came on writ of error from the Territory of Utah.
The defendant relied on the Eighth Amendment as inhibiting the
Territory, which derived its authority from the Federal Govern-
ment and was therefore subject to the constitutional limitations
of the Bill of Rights. A territorial statute provided that a capital
offense should be punished by "being shot, hung, or beheaded," as
the court should direct or as the defendant should elect. The
defendant had been convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to be shot. It was held that death by shooting was not
an unusual punishment, since it was less arduous than methods
known to the common law14 and was regularly imposed under the
9. Stat. 1 W. & M., c. 2, § i, 10.
10. Analogous provisions were not unknown to the States: e.g., the
Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Bay Colony included, in 1641: "For
bodilie punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane, barbarous,
or cruel." Colonial Laws of Mass. (1889), p. 43. See also the pre-1791 state
constitutional provisions collected by Mr. Justice White in Weems v. United
States, 217 U. S. 349, 394 (1910).
11. It must be remembered that incarceration before trial can be used,
in the absence of deliverance on habeas corpus, to punish without a hearing.
Cf. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 9, Cl. 2, prohibiting suspension of the writ of
hbeas corpus "unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it." Cooley, op. cit. supra note 7, at 338-345; 6 Holdsworth,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 39.
12. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1878). Pervear v. Massachusetts,
5 Wall. 475 (U.S. 1867) had ended in curt dismissal of a writ of error on
which defendant contended that a fine of $50 and 3 months at hard labor for
illegal sale of liquor was cruel and unusual.
13. See note 115 infra.
14. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 135 (1878) : dragging to place of
execution for treason; disembowelling alive, beheading, and quartering, for
high treason; dissection for murder; burning alive for treason by a female.
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Articles of V"Tar.15 No torture being involved, the writ of error
was dismissed.
The next important decision was In re Kemmler,16 in which
the petitioner, who was under death sentence imposed by a state
court, attacked the constitutionality of electrocution as violative
of the Eighth Amendment and the due process of law and privileges
and immunities guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
case arose on an original petition for writ of habeas corpus from
the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus was denied on the ground
that the petitioner should first be heard in the Federal Circuit
Court. 7 However, the New York Court of Appeals had already
affirmed the denial of habeas corpus by a state court, so that the
United States Supreme Court undertook to fiear the merits on a
motion for a writ of error to review the state habeas corpus de-
cision.""
The sentence, pursuant to statute, read in part:
"... . by then and there causing to pass through the body of
him .. .a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause
death, and that the application of such current of electricity be
continued until he .. .be dead."' 9
In the legislative discussions leading up to the adoption of electro-
cution for capital punishment, there had been a great deal of
scientific information considered, all of it directed to whether the
method was dependable and instantaneous. 0 Much evidence of
a similar nature had been taken in the New York judicial pro-
ceeding. The Court of Appeals had held first that evidence could
not be introduced to overthrow the presumption of constitutionality;
and secondly, even if the evidence were considered, the defendant
had failed in the attempt.21 The state court had treated the case
as one involving only the state constitution, but since the state
and federal provisions were substantially alike, the state court,
15. The Articles did not specify the manner of inflicting the death
penalty, but custom approved shooting or banging. Id. at 133-135.
16. 136 U. S. 436 (1890).
17. The writ of habeas corpus had already been granted by the Circuit
Court, and hearing was imminent.
18. Such appears to have been common practice. See, e.g., Spies v.
Illinois, 123 U. S. 131 (1887).
19. It re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 441 (1890).
20. Id. at 444, 449.
It was the legislature of the same State which, by basing its 1933 Milk
Control Act on even more thorough investigation and findings of fact, laid
the foundation for the reversal of the laissez-faire trend of substantive due
process decisions. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
21. People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 569, 24 N. E. 6(1890).
1951]
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in substance, had decided the federal question adversely to Kemm-
ler.
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the privileges
and immunities clause applied, there being no right connected with
federal citizenship, 22 and repeated as settled "law the principle
that the first eight Amendments restricted only the Federal Gov-
ernment.23 However, the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller went on
to indicate that even if electrocution were employed by the Federal
Government, no constitutional right would be violated:
"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a linger-
ing death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word used in the Constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life."
24
With the decision of the Kemmler case, the basic issue of the
constitutionality of electrocution was settled. And indeed no serious
doubt was entertained by any of the state courts which later came
to consider the constitutionality of the lethal gas chamber.25 Nearly
sixty years passed before the constitutionality of electrocution
again was considered by the Supreme Court.
26
In 1946, an attempted electrocution of Willie Francis failed,
presumably because of mechanical defect. Denial of writs of cer-
tiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus by the state
courts27 was followed by Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber in
the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. 28 The petitioner contended
that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause would be
violated by a second execution, insofar as the due process provision
22. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873); Spies v. Illinois,
123 U. S. 131 (1887) ; compare Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935),
with Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83 (1940).
23. See cases cited note 5 mtpra; 2 Story, Commentaries on the Consti-
tution § 1904 (2d ed. 1851).
24. In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447 (1890). The decision was ren-
dered only three days after the case was argued orally, indicating that there
was little dispute within the Court.
25. Approving retrospective application of the new method of execu-
tion: Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P. 2d 18 (1934) ; State v. Brown,
342 Mo. 53, 112 S. W. 2d 568 (1938). Approving statute allowing only
prospective application: State v. Brice, 214 N. C. 34, 197 S. E. 690 (1938) ;
see Cal. Penal Code § 3604 (1949). Approving prospective application of
ambiguous statute: State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 P. 676, 30 A. L. R.
1443 (1923). The consensus is that the lethal gas chamber is a more humane
device than any previously employed.
26. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180 (1915) indicates how
thoroughly the issue was closed.
27. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v" Resweber, 212 La. 143, 31 So. 2d 697
(1947).
28. 329 U. S.459 (1947).
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protected against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punish-
ments.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for four members
of the Court, it was assumed arguendo that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment included protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
2 9
And it was presumed (absent proof) that the state officials had
carried out their duties in a careful and humane manner.30 The
vague contours of the due process clause were expanded to in-
clude some element of protection against arbitrary punishment:
"The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law
forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the
death sentence .... The Fourteenth [Amendment] would pro-
hibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel
manner."31
However, the Court concluded that the petitioner was the victim
of an unfortunate accident, inflicting on him no more hardship
than would have resulted if the cell block had burned down. No
law can protect against accidents. 32 The concurrence of Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, which was needed to constitute a majority, was
grounded upon the continued freedom of the state to administer
criminal justice unless it should offend "some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." 33
Four members of the Court were unwilling to decide against
the petitioner in the existing state of the record. They urged that
the case be remanded for further trial of the question of whether
in fact current was applied to the petitioner, and if so, how much.34
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Burton emphasized that if
29. Id. at 462.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 463. The struggle to select those fundamental notions of
justice in a free society which the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses has been the object of a long series of cases. See
supra, note 5. It would seem that at least the portion of the Eighth Amend-
ment providing against cruel and unusual punishments is sufficiently in-
grained in the fabric of Anglo-American tradition to qualify. Cf. 2 Story,
op. cit. supra note 23, at § 1903: ". . . it is scarcely possible, that any de-
partment of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious
conduct."
32. Id. at 459, 464-465. A 6ontention grounded on denial of equal pro-
tection by inflicting psychological stress which others avoided was similarly
rejected. In 1701, Captain Kidd was hanged again, when the rope broke the
first time. 1 Pelham, Chronicles of Crime 6 (1887).
33. Id. at 469, quoting language of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
34. Justices Burton, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. Id. at 472. In
the briefs there were conflicting affidavits as to what had occurred to Francis
at the first attempt.
19511
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in fact there would be a second application of electric current, this
would not be instantaneous execution, which had been upheld in
Kemmiler's case.35 To the minority the intent of- the executioners
was irrelevant: torture is torture to the tortured whether in-
tentional or not. As for the interest of Louisiana in punishing
offenders the dissenters would regard the problem as one for the
state to solve. Should there be a denial of due process by the pro-
posed punishment, the state would have to find other means of
dealing with petitioner. 6
In the year following the Kemnier case, perhaps encouraged
by the results of a case involving an ex post facto law, 37 appeals
were brought in two cases on the ground that solitary confinement
pending electrocution violated an alleged "fundamental right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishments inflicted by a state."38
The contention was justly regarded as of little merit.
In 1910, Weents v. United States"9 came to the Court through
the territorial courts of the Philippine Islands. Upon conviction
of falsifying a public and official document recording certain wage
payments (without proof of fraud, injury to anyone, or even selfish
purpose), the defendant had been sentenced to fifteen years cadena
temporal,40 and fined four thousand pesetas and costs. The cadena
temporal was a form of punishment derived from the Spanish
regime in the Philippines and had long been employed there. Un-
der such a sentence the prisoner was kept at hard labor, chained
at the ankles and wrists, and deprived of any assistance from
without the prison. He was subjected to civil interdiction, perpetual
absolute disqualification, and surveillance for life.
35. Id. at 473-477.
36. Id. at 480-481. It is doubtful that other. means could be found with-
out violating the ex post facto clause. See, e.g., Hartung v. People, 26 N. Y.
167 (1863). Death could not be imposed and imprisonment was not authorized
by statute at the time of the crime.
37. Ex parte Medley, 134 U. S. 160 (1890), discussed text at note 184
infra. Medley's case was put to some astonishing uses. In Rogers v. Peck, 199
U. S. 425 (1905), it was relied upon, even though the confinement was the
result of successive reprieves granted to enable the condemned woman to
prosecute appeals.
38. McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (1891) ; Trezza v. Brush, 142
U. S. 160 (1891). In both cases, the question was raised on appeal from
denial of habeas corpus by federal court. The circumstance that there had
been a reversal of the first trial on appeal by the defendant, followed by a
conviction at the second trial (with duplication of the solitary confinement)
was regarded as of little importance. Cf. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177
U. S. 155 (1900).
39. 217 U. S. 349 (1910). Due to deaths and illness, the Court con-
sisted of only six: Chief Justice Fuller and Justices McKenna, Harlan, and
Day for reversal; Justices Holmes and White dissenting.
40. Literally "temporary chains."
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In language strongly reminiscent of Marshall's: "We must
never forget it is a constitution we are expounding," the Court
held, in an opinion by Mr. Justice McKenna, that the punishments
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment should not be limited to
those forms of torture which the framers of the Bill of Rights had
in mind.41 In short, that a punishment was developed under the
Roman rather than the Anglo-Saxon dispensation made it no
less subject to condemnation. 42 Strongly weighing against the
validity of the punishment, was the fact that it exceeded by far
the punishments exacted for greater crimes.43
Justices White and Holmes dissented on two grounds: first,
the question of the punishment being cruel and unusual had not
been raised below; secondly, the legislature should be left free to
fix the punishment according to the necessity of the situation with-
out measuring it against those imposed in other United States juris-
dictions, and without including a reformatory objective in framing
the treatment of offenders. 44 The opinion by Mr. Justice White em-
phasized the supposed function of the English Bill of Rights, from
which the Eighth Amendment was derived, in limiting the Crown
and the judiciary, but not the Parliment.4 5 He argued that the
English interpretation was that "cruel and unusual" must be re-
garded disjunctively and that cadena temporal could in no sense
be considered "cruel" because no torture was involved.4 6
A few attacks, most of them abortive, have been made recently
upon the constitutionality of the chain gang as it is employed
in some of the Southern states.4 7 Thus far, no case has brought
the question to the Supreme Court for decision on the merits.,
41. Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910). Actually the
provision at issue was the Article of the Organic Act corresponding to the
cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment.
42. Transition from Civil Law to Anglo-American notions in the
newly acquired Spanish Territories involved a series of cases turning on the
cx proprio zigore doctrine. See, e.g., note 90 infra.
43. Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
44. Id. at 383-87.
45. Id. at 397. A leading British historian concludes that the English
Bill of Rights was intended to bind all branches of government by reestab-
lishing the supremacy of law. 6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 8, at 258-262.
46. Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 401 (1910).
47. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F. 2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Jackson v. Ruthazer,
181 F. 2d 588 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 980; Johnson v.
Matthews, 182 F. 2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 828;
Ex parte Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771 (D. N.J. 1949) ; Harper v. Wall, 85 F.
Supp. 783 (D. N.J. 1949) ; People ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 90 N. Y. S. 2d
205 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; In re Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (D.S. Cal. 1950).
48. In Johnson v. Dye, supra note 47, it was held, six judges sitting
en bane (one dissenting in part), that the. Georgia chain gang as the testi-
mony described it constituted a cruel punishment prohibited by the Fourteenth
1951]
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The problem of proof is extreme in such situations and may pre-
clude for a long time a definitive adjudication of the issue." Cer-
tain it is that if conditions continue in those states, the enlarge-
ment of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Francis
case, at least to include torture within the methods of punishment
prohibited by the due process clause, will provide a healthy atmos-
phere in which the fuel of the Weems case can be used.50
(2) Excessive Punishment
The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits "excessive fines."
As we have seen, the object was to eliminate the possibility of
abuses such as had existed in England prior to the Revolution.51
There is, however, no express limitation on the quantity of other
forms of punishment which may be imposed.
At the outset one caveat must be noted. The problem of in-
terpretation of a criminal statute to determine what is the unit
of prohibited conduct to which a given measure of punishment is
applied, is completely distinct from the problem of applying the
constitutional limitation to the punishment ultimately imposed
through the definitive action of the sentencing court. Consequently
we are not concerned primarily with those cases which involve
the question of how many offenses have been committed, how-
ever unwise it may seem that there should be multiplication of
offenses by reason of some minor distinguishing element.52 Of
Amendment. The case arose in a Federal District Court in Pennsylvania on
petition for writ of habeas corpus by an escaped convict who was being held
for extradition. The judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court per
curiam on the authority of Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944), -for
failure to exhaust remedies in the state courts-in 338 U. S. 864 (1949).
Crucial, indeed, will be the question of the proper remedy where the
issue is raised in the state of asylum: remand to the demanding state, abso-
lute discharge, or conditional discharge are some of the possibilities. See
Note, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 174 (1949).
49. E.g., The petitioner in Johnson v. Dye, supra note 47, called as wit-
nesses other fugitives, and a former Army man who had observed such puni-
tive methods in Georgia. Also magazine articles dealing with conditions in
Georgia were introduced. The difficulty is even greater than that encountered
in proof of foreign law, because the credibility of the witnesses is necessarily
suspect. Undoubtedly prejudices such as hamper the enforcement of the
Federal Civil Rights Statutes would similarly make an attack upon the chain
gang in local courts at least as difficult.
50. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,-
dissenting, arguing that execution of an insane person would deny due
process of law).
51. See text at note 8 supra.
52. See text at note 139, infra, where the matter is considered at length.
Typical are In re Henry, 123 U. S. 372 (1887) (each mailing, and each
receipt of a single letter or packet held a separate offense of using the mails
[Vol. 35:10
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course, the punishment, as ultimately imposed, must be tested
in relation to the crime and the criminal, for obviously there
can be no "excessive fine" or "imprisonment of such duration as
to violate the fundamental notion of due process of law," in the
abstract. "Make the punishment fit the crime!" is more than a
lilting lyric. Still the interpretation of the statute is an inde-
pendent process, subject only to the usual desire to avoid con-
stitutional doubts.
One of the earliest cases involving the excessiveness of punish-
ment, and one deserving renewed interest since the decision of the
Francis case was O'Neil v. Vermont.5 3 The defendant had been
convicted of selling liquor in violation of Vermont law. 54 Each
sale, under the state statute, constituted a separate offense and
was subject to a fine of twenty dollars. Proof was found adequate
by the state courts on 307 offenses, with the result that the total
fine exceeded six thousand dollars.5 The defendant was sentenced
(unless payment was made within a fixed time) to imprisonment
for 19,914 days (over 54 years) at the going rate of three days
for each dollar. The writ of error was dismissed by the Supreme
Court for want of an adequately presented federal question.56
Such a holding is somewhat appalling even today, however
to defraud); Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916); Ebeling v.
Morgan, 237 U. S. 625 (1915) (each cutting of one of a number of mail bags
held a separate offense).
53. 144 U. S. 323 (1892).
54. These were C.O.D. sales made from New York State, through in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce. The case was litigated in the state
courts during the reign of the License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U.S. 1847). Leisy
v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890) was decided after the writ of error had
been taken to the Supreme Court. It seems certain from the opinions that the
Court considered that the latter application of the silence of Congress doc-
trine would strike down the Vermont statute as applied to this type of
transaction. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont, supra note
53, at 366, indicates the belief that the interstate commerce question was
still open to defendant, the necessary result of the state action being to
follow the License Cases. The lesson for the lawyer is all too clear.
55. The jury found the defendant guilty of 307 sales. Earlier, a justice
of the peace had found O'Neil had made 457 sales, and imposed a sentence
of 28,836 days (approximately 79 years). O'Neil's appeal to the jury thus
reduced the sentence 25 years. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 326-27(1892).
56. The position of the majority was that the only point taken in the
State Court and again asserted in the Supreme Court was that the sales
%ad been completed outside Vermont. Defendant's assignment of error ap-
)eared to abandon the cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fine
objection. Id. at 334. It is clear that the opinion of the Supreme Court of
'Vermont decided that even though a federal constitutional objection might
be based upon the excessiveness of punishment for a single offense, the mere
fact defendant had committed so many offenses, could not create a federal
question. See O'Neil case below, 58.Vt. 140, 165 (1885).
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sympathetic one may be with the need for sound federal-state
relations, and for freedom in the state legislature to deal adequately
with the problems of crime prevention. And so it is not surprising
that Mr. Justice Field, oldest in point of service on the bench at
the time,5 7 found such a sentence for a crime of this kivd too much
to stand approved, especially by refusal of the Court to intervene
because the defendant had failed to include the constitutional objec-
tion in the assignment of errors. 5 Harking back to his dissent in
an earlier case wherein the doctrine had been rejected,5 9 he argued
that the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment
at least encompassed the right of free men to immunity from such
arbitrary imposition. He showed quite conclusively that an inde-
pendent judgment by the Court, giving due weight to the initial
determination by the legislature of the suitability of the punish-
ment, is necessary if the constitutional limitation on punishments is
to have any effect at all.?' As for the argument that the defendant
had merely made himself liable to a multiplicity of punishments
by committing a multiplicity of offenses, he stated the reductio thus:
"The State may, indeed, make the drinking of one drop of
liquor an offense to be punished by imprisonment, but it would
be an unheard-of cruelty if it should count the drops in a single
glass and make thereby a thousand offenses, and thus extend the
punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an im-
prisonment of almost indefinite duration."
' 61
Joining in dissent were Justices Harlan 2 and Brewer, who felt
that at least the defendant was entitled to have a decision on the
merits, the questions having been raised and implicitly decided
below.63
57. Then 76 years of age, with 29 years on the Court.
58. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 364-65 (1892).
59. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873). Mr. Justice Field,
also emphasized the argument of J. Randolph Tucker, in Spies v. Illinois, 123
U. S. 131 (1887) ; See note 5 supra.
60. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 339-341 (1892). This is a thesis
which some members of the Court would appear at times to have rejected,
even when dealing with statutes directly subject to the Eighth Amendment.
See text at note 44 supra.
61. Id. at 340. Compare City of Hoboken v. Bauer, 26 N. J. Misc. 1,
55 AtI. 2d 883 (1947) (where defendant was liable to a $24,600 fine [or
about 30 years for failure to pay] "all because she owned and possessed a
penny bubble gum machine.").
62. Also a dissenter in Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S.
1873).
63. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 366 (1892). Subsequently the
Supreme Court of Vermont denied a motion in arrest of judgment and
ordered execution, some eleven years after the jury found O'Neil guilty. State
v. O'Nel, 66 Vt. 356 (1894).
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As the warnings in the Weems 64 and Francis65 cases made
clear, and this case brings home even more poignantly, there is
in any consideration of the cruelty, or novelty, or excessiveness
of punishment the problem of evolving a standard according to
which the particular punishment, being employed in a particular
context, must be measured. 6  And there is here as in a few other
types of cases, an emotional reaction to the predicament of the
defendant in question or to the attempt of the legislature to deal
with a knotty question of protection of the public interest, which
tends to becloud the issue and even the process through which it
has arisen. 7 It is no help to the Court that the usual case which
decides anything about punishment that is really worth deciding
takes on the aura of a cause cglbre.
During the three decades following the O'Neil case, there
were several cases brought to the Supreme Court seeking to chal-
lenge state-imposed punishments on one ground or another. 68 All
failed. 69 None of them could hope to evoke the sympathy O'Neil
demanded. The position of the Court was consistently that ex-
pressed in the last case of the series in the words of Mr. Justice
Pitney:
64. See text at note 44 supra, dissent of Mr. Justice White.
65. See text at note 28 supra.
66. The matter is considered from a psychological viewpoint in Braden,
The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 Yale L. J. 571 (1947);
see District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 628 (1937) (Stone, J.).
67. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 .U. S. 258, 342(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); State v. Olander, 193 Iowa 1379, 186
N. W. 53 (1922) (Evans, J., concurring) where the emotional pressures
are analyzed.
68. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126 (1903) (10 years in penitentiary
for conspiracy to defraud) ; Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502 (1915) (1-14
years imprisonment, rejecting contention Eighth Amendment applied to
States).
Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204 U. S. 659 (1907) (penalty of $22,390
to be paid to County from which defendant had embezzled one-half that
sum, with no allowance for restitution); Seaboard Air Line Railway v.
Seegers, 207 U. S. 73 (1907) (penalty of fifty dollars for failure to pay a
$1.75 claim against defendant common carrier); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas (No. 1), 212 U. S. 86 (1909) ($1,623,500 penalties for violation of
state anti-trust laws, assessed against defendant corporation with over
forty million dollars in assets, rejecting argument based on due process
clause) ; St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Co. v. Williams,
251 U. S. 63 (1919) ($75 penalty, plus attorney's fees, for 624 overcharge).
In United States ex rel. Milwaukee S. D. Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U. S. 407, 435 (1921) (Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, with whom
Mr. Justice Holmes concurred, considered deprivation of the second-class
mail privilege, increasing relator's costs up to $150 per day, a cruel and
unusual punishment, since it was an indefinite fine).
69. It must be noted that Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910)
is the only Supreme Court decision holding that punishment violated the
Constitution because of cruelty or excessiveness.
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".. . The States still possess a wide latitude of discretion in
the matter and ... their enactments transcend the limitation
[of due process] only where the penalty prescribed is so severe
and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense
and obviously unreasonable.1
7 0
Note that there is inherent in this statement the ultimate hold-
ing of the Francis case: due process is denied if punishment and
offense have no rational relation or if punishment is transmuted
into inhuman treatment.
An auxiliary issue, which was rather summarily dismissed
from several of the cases, arose because fines or penalties were
payable to the person injured by the prohibited conduct, rather
than to the state. Many were truly penal in that they were intended
to punish an offense against the state and the amount had no
relation to compensation of the individual. 71 Here again the legis-
latures were left free to run the gamut in devising remedies; so
long as there was reasonable relation between the method em-
ployed and the interest of the public, the probable frequency of
the offense, the harm done, the difficulty of detection, and the
likelihood of other remedies being employed.
72
Thus in this area of the interrelation between the legislatures
and the Federal Constitution as implemented by the Supreme
Court, we have broad underlying freedom for the legislatures to
lay down the basic rule, prospectively, within wide channels of
discretion, fr.ee as they are from the emotional impulses created
by the context of a particular case.73 And the state judiciary
is likewise free to interpret and to test the law by its own
fundamental notions of fairness. But in the background is the
Court and the federal due process limitation, given added color
by the related specific provisions of the Eighth Amendment and




70. St. Louis, Iron Mountain, and Southern Railway Co. v. Williams,
251 U. S. 63, 66 (1919).
71. Cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
72. See note 68, par. 2 supra. There is a myriad of cases involving due
process and equal protection objections to various penalty and punitive
damage provisions in regulatory statutes. See, e.g., Annotations, 13 A. L. R.
829, 19 A. L. R. 205, 26 A. L. R. 1200, 51 A. L. R. 1379.
73. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 469
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
74. The presumption of innocence, and the related guarantee of free-
dom from compulsory self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment) are the foun-
dation of the Anglo-American criminal procedure.
4 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 2250-2251 (2d ed. 1923). The antithesis is




". Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. .. "
So reads the Fifth Amendment. 5 As we shall see, this is a
constitutional provision of decei*ing simplicity fraught today with
convolutions certain to trip him who reads while running.
Protection against double jeopardy is of great antiquity. It
appears to have been borrowed from canonical procedure by
both the Anglo-American and Continental systems.7 6 Maxims
have variously expressed the concept: "nemo debet bis puniri pro
uno delicto;" and "nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa." 
7
While the general notion was familiar to the pre-Revolutionary
common law, it had not been applied consistently. The pleas of
"autrefois acquit," "autrefois convict," and even "autrefois attaint"
were available,78 subject to extensive exceptions. 79 It 'seems un-
likely that verdicts in criminal cases were reversed by attaint, as
they certainly were in civil cases, although there is doubt about
the historical fact.80 But jurors were fined and otherwise abused,
and mistrials on pretext occurred often enough to cause Black-
stone to remonstrate though he contended that the practice had
long been abandoned."' By the late eighteenth century, however,
only the ancient survival, appeal of felony, remained-an ex-
piring but still adamant contradiction of the principle.8 2
Thus, by the time of the adoption of our Bill of Rights the
concept of not-twice-in-jeopardy had become well established in
the new States. There were exceptions; but generally once a man
out of his own mouth. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 54, 57, 59 (1949)
(Justices Frankfurter, Jackson).
Encroachments such as that in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78
(1908) and Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) which allowed
comment on the failure of defendant to testify are far on the fringe. See
comment on Palko v. Connecticut, text at note 87 infra.
75. Proposed, with the rest of the "Bill of Rights," by Congressional
Resolution, September 25, 1789; ratified by required three-fourths of the
states, December 15, 1791.
76. Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History 228 (1936).
77. Broom, Legal Maxims 223-226 (10th ed. 1939).
78. Coke, Third Institute 213-214, c. 101.
79. 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 521, § 8 (8th ed. 1824); Id. at
528, § 15 states exceptions common today: retrial for insufficiency of first
indictment, or after mistrial.
80. 1 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 8, at 340.
81. 4 BI. Comm. *354. See also 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 294-296
(Wilson ed. 1800) [Hale died in 1676].
82. 2 Wooddesson, Law Lectures 564, Lecture 38 (1792); 2 Holds-
worth, op. cit. supra note 8, at 361-364. In 1794, Parliament rejected a pro-
;osal to abolish appeal of murder in Massachusetts. Appeal of murder was
finally abolished in 1819, along with trial by battle. 59 Geo. III, c. 46 (1819).
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was tried, he could not be tried again for the same offense. 3
A most complete review of the law by Mr. Justice Story shows
that this constitutional protection against double jeopardy had
incorporated a common law doctrine, amorphous indeed, but
nevertheless possessed of a hard center core.8 4 Today certainly the
basic protection has been preserved and perhaps considerably more.
In criminal matters, even more than in civil, there has been con-
stant recognition that court proceedings demand repose.
(1) Multiplicity of Trials
First we must consider the primary meaning of the double
jeopardy provision. Like the rest of the first eight Amendments
it is a limitation on the Federal Government. Its direct and im-
mediate function is as a protection against the individual being
submitted to a multiplicity of trials for the same offense15 Although
a detailed analysis of the cases on multiple trials is beyond this
undertaking,86 one point must be made clear about the leading
83. A. L. I., Administration of the Criminal Law, Official Draft, Sub-ject: Double Jeopardy 8 (1935), states that conviction, or acquittal were
required for a valid plea in bar at common law, and surmises that later
notions of "jeopardy" attaching on the swearing of the jury arose from mis-
understanding a supposed rule of Coke that the jury must be kept together
until verdict delivered.
84. United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,204 (C.C.D. Mass.
1834). The lengthy opinion contains most of the learning on the subject up
to that time. Story's dictum that the double jeopardy clause prohibited grant-
ing a new trial even at the defendants' motion was an extremely mechanical
application of the maxim. District Judge Davis dissented from the dictum,
but agreed that, assuming that the Court had the power, the defendants
should not receive a new trial. See 1 Bishop, Commentaries on Criminal Law
728-729 (9th ed. 1923), to the effect that the American application has been,
on the whole, much more strict on the prosecution than is the practice in
British courts.
85. The extension of the meaning of "life and limb" to cover all
forms of criminal punishment was accomplished at common law, prior to
1789. Indeed "life and limb" was used as a generic term for bodily security.
1 BI. Comm. *130. 1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 84, at 733-734, states the
primary meaning as limited to treason, and felonies, but approves extension
to misdemeanors. See note 108 infra.
86. Most of the cases involve questions of the following types:
(1) When the defendant seeks a new trial, does he waive the bar of
the first trial, and if so, how extensive is the waiver? Harding v. United
States, I Wall. Jr. 127 (3d Cir. 1846) ; Trono v. United States, 199 U. S.
521 (1905) ; Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U. S. 284 (1910) ; Stroud v. United
States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919) ;(2) when is the first trial void, so that jeopardy never attached? Cole-
man v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 (1878) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S.
662 (1896) ;
(3) when, if ever, 'may the prosecution secure a reversal of a trial and
subject the defendant to a second trial? Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S.
"100 (1904) ; Palli6 v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937) ;
(4) when, if ever, may 'a trial be interrupted before one tribunal prior
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decision in this area. Palko v. Connecticut 7 decided no more than
that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not prohibit
a state from trying again a defendant who was previously con-
victed of a lesser-included offense in a trial marred by error pre-
judicial to the prosecution. No opinion was expressed upon
"what the answer would have to be if the state were permitted
after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or
to bring another case against him. . .. "I's
Indeed the heavy reliance in Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion 9
upon the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner v. United
States,0 indicates that there might have been considerable doubt
that the latter case was correctly decided. The test would seem to be
whether the accused is being unduly harassed, a nice question to
be decided from all the circumstances in an effort to see if there is
a departure from "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."9' 1
But the distinction is wide between chasing a man down for
trial on the same facts after once having finished the matter ac-
cording to the forms of law, in a fair and errorless trial and merely
rectifying an erroneous trial under one and the same indictment.9 2
And we shall see that there is considerable doubt that even the
duplication of punishment for the same offense constitutes a
to verdict, and the defendant be subjected to a new trial before a second
tribunal? United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U.S. 1824); Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U. S. 684 (1949).
87. 302 U. S. 319 (1937). Extension of the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States was summarily rejected, following Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
88. Id. at 319, 328.
89. Id. at 319, 322-23.
90. 195 U. S. 100, 134 (1904). Justices White and McKenna joined
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes. Mr. Justice Brown also
dissented in a separate opinion. Much of the Holmes dissent relies on the
weakness of the rationale of the cases which had held that a defendant
"waived" the prior jeopardy by seeking a new trial or taking an appeal.
Note 86 (1) supra. It is certain that the dissenters spoke from great con-
viction, for the Kepner, Dorr, and Mendesona cases involved other serious
questions as to the doctrine of expansion of the Constitution ex proprio
vigore, and the proper method of construing the extension of constitutional
limitations to territories by Act of Congress. See note 42 supra. That the
latter questions were not allowed to obliterate the basic constitutional issue
on double jeopardy indicates that the subject was considered with great care.
At any rate, Kepner v. United States, today stands unchallenged as to
the Federal Government and probably will remain so unless the rule is
changed by statute. The acquiescence of Congress in the rule of the Kepner
case would probably, although not inevitably, preclude reversal at this late
date. In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 688 (1949), the Court found it
unnecessary to reach a similar question involving the Fortieth Article of War.
91. Kepner v. United States, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
92. See Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 Yale L. J. 674, 678 et seq. (1926).
The author was counsel for the State of Connecticut in the Palko case.
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violation of the double jeopardy provision itself, however erroneous
the statutory interpretation may be, or however much other con-
stitutional provisions may be violated. 3
(2). Punishment by Different Sovereignties for
the Same Conduct
One of the great host of constitutional problems emanating
from our federal form of government is that which results from
the presence of power in both the state and the federal govern-
ments to prohibit certain conduct and to punish it as criminal.
The question whether simultaneous exercise of that dual power
violates the double jeopardy provision was first passed upon in
Fox v. Ohio.94 A defendant who had been convicted of passing
counterfeit coin in violation of Ohio law contended unsuccessfully
that Congress had exclusive power to coin money and regulate
its value, and to punish for counterfeiting. Furthermore, it was
argued, even if the power were'not exclusive since Congress still
had power to punish the same offense, the defendant might be
punished twice for one and the same crime, if the conviction
were allowed to stand. The Court denied that the Fifth Amend-
ment applied to the states and laid down the principle that even
should both state and federal governments punish the same con-
duct, there would be no violation of any constitutional right since
the double punishment was an inherent result of there being two
sovereign powers whose laws the defendant was obliged to obey.95
The principle has been reapplied on several occasions, 96 and
in United States v. Lanza was held to apply even where the
alleged second jeopardy was being imposed in a federal court for
a federal offense to which undoubtedly the Fifth Amendment
93. Such an assertion requires rejection of old doctrine which has
been blindly followed. But of that, more anon. Text at note 105 et seq. infra.
94. 5 How. 410 (U.S. 1847). ,
95. Mr. Justice McLean dissented; and Mr. Justice Story, who died
before the reargument, expressed convictions similar to those held by
Justice McLean. See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 72 (U.S. 1820) (dis-
senting opinion). Because of the conflict of opinion among the Court and
the absence of several justices, reargument was requested. See Fox v. Ohio
5 How. 410, 440 (U.S. 1847). The Court did not rely on the technical dis-
tinction between counterfeiting and uttering, since both state and federal
law at the time prohibited uttering counterfeit coin.
96. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13 (U.S. 1852) (state prosecution for
harboring fugitive slave) ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926) (state
prosecution for violation of prohibition law).
The rationale was the same when threatened incrimination under the
laws of a State was held no bar to compulsion of testimony by the Federal




The converse principle-protecting defendants-has been ap-
plied as to criminal offenses made such by laws which derive
their authority from the same sovereign power.9 There are con-
tradictions in this doctrine, although at first glance it seems to
be a simple application of analogy. Its complexities are analyzed
infra, where the author's thesis is that statutory interpretation is
in issue and not the impact of the Constitution. 9
(3) Punishment by Same Sovereignty for
the Same Conduct
When, at the behest of the same sovereignty, punishment for
a single crime is incurred on two or more occasions, or in two or
more tribunals, the defendant would seem' (at least prima facie)
to be placed in double jeopardy. The possible situations are quite
numerous: (1) the statutes may authorize alternative punish-
ments for the same offense, and both may be imposed ;100 (2) the
statutes may impose two or more punishments for the same
offense;1O1 (3) the statutes may define and punish substantially
the same acts as two or more separate crimes, although there is
only a formal distinction between them;102 (4) the statutes may
vary the punishment according to the number or character of
97. 260 U. S. 377 (1922) (federal prosecution for violation of prohibi-
tion laws followed upon state prosecution for the same offense). The opinion
of Mr. Justice Taft reveals a fear that if prior jeopardy in state courts were
a bar, convictions on guilty pleas, with light sentences from friendly judges,
would provide substantial immunity from federal prosecution. Sumptuary
laws such as the prohibition acts perhaps justify such a fear. At any rate,
the constitutional doctrine is settled. See however, the strong criticism in
Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 Col. L. Rev. 1309(1932), based on the dubious proposition that the federal-state relationship
is completely analogous to international sovereignty-to-sovereignty relation-
ship.
98. Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907) (court martial
bar to civil court prosecution); cf. United States v. Bayer, 331 U. S. 532
(1947).
Porto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253 (1937) (since prosecution for
violation of territorial antitrust law followed by prosecution for violation
of federal antitrust law would violate double jeopardy provision, territorial
statute held valid). Usually no double jeopardy is found in cases involving
prosecutions for violating both state criminal statutes and municipal ordi-
nances, under analogous state constitutional provisions: Ogden v. City of
Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 89 N. W. 568 (1901); Guinthers v. City of Mil-
waukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N. W. 865 (1935) ; Thomas v. City of Indian-
apolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924) ; and cases collected in Annota-
tion 31 L. R. A. (n.s.) 693 at 699.
99. See text at note 134 infra.
100. Text at note 111 infra.
101. Text at note 128 infra.
102. Text at note 139 infra.
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previous offenses ;10 and (5) the statutes may provide, as con-
strued by the courts, that under certain circumstances punish-
ment may be repeatedly inflicted. 04
Although it may seem that at least some of the above in-
stances are classic examples of a "person [being] subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' 05
it is submitted that none of the above should be construed to fall
within the ban of the double jeopardy provision. The only sound
application of that provision is when, although the second trial
will impose no punishment different in kind upon the defendant,
he is again put on trial for an offense constituted by the same set
of facts after the first trial was completed and free from error. 00
This thesis is perhaps best stated in the proposition that double
punishment for the same offense in no way violates the double
jeopardy provision. First, the language of the Fifth Amendment
bears this out: "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."'07 Now it is
clear that no man could possibly be punished twice by taking his
life twice. It is not so clear that a man might not be deprived of
two ears when the statute called for deprivation of one. 08 But
it is certain that the members of the proposing Congress were not
so troubled about judges exceeding the statutory punishment as
they were that cases would be tried again and again until the
desired result was achieved. We must not forget that Bushell's
Case"0 ' had given the jury its independence scarcely a century
before. And it seems to need no argument to establish that there
103. Text at note 144 infra.
104. Repetition of solitary confinement was involved in three cases cited
in note 38 supra.
105. Fifth Amendment.
106. See text at note 76 supra, for a review of the history. Comley,
Former Jeopardy, 35 Yale L. J. 674, 679 (1926) shows clearly that the pro-
hibition of appeal by the Federal Government (Kepner v. United States,
195 U. S. 100 (1904)) is explicable on common law procedural grounds but
not as double jeopardy.
107. It must be remembered that the number of offenses which were
not capital, or subject to embellishments upon capital punishment of worse
kind, such as drawing or quartering, were still very few. 2 Wooddesson, op.
cit. supra note 82, at 494. Transportation, chief alternative punishment, was
not employed to any great extent until the compulsory settlement of
Australia was begun in 1776. See 1 Radzinowicz, History of English
Criminal Law 4,31 (1948).
108. However, the words "life or limb" were said by Chief Judge
Kent, in People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 201 (N.Y. 1820) to indicate that
class of crimes subject to deprivation of life or limb at common law, i.e.,
felonies. In no State were crimes still punished in 1791 by loss of members.
See note 85 supra.




was an intrinsic nexus between the twice-in-jeopardy provision
of the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment guarantee
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."
Since the decisions in many of these areas stand the other
way,"10 there is profit in considering the cases for the light that
can be shed on the error if there be one.
(A) Alternative Punishments
The leading case on the matter of alternative punishments is
Ex parte Lange,'-" an historic case, otherwise, for its extension
of habeas corpus as a method of review of criminal causes." 2 The
petitioner had been convicted in federal circuit court of stealing
mail bags. The statute set the punishment at imprisonment for
one year or a fine. The court sentenced the defendant to serve one
year and to pay the maximum fine. He was committed immediately.
On the following day the fine was paid and (apparently at the in-
sistence of Lange's attorney) covered into the Treasury three
days later. On the day after the funds had been covered in, the
petitioner was brought into the sentencing court on a writ of habeas
corpus, the original sentence vacated and petitioner sentenced once
again to one year imprisonment to run from the time of resenten-
cing.' 13 On an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court
it was held that the effect of revising the sentence, as the Court
had done, was to punish petitioner twice for the same offense
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.1 4 Since the judgment of
resentence was unconstitutional, it was void, and the judgment
110. Perhaps the tools which ought to be used in construing the pat-
tern of criminal statutes are based on the same psychological phenomena
that lie behind the double jeopardy clause in the Constitution. It may be
that many of the difficulties are merely verbal. If so, it is another case of
correct decisions for the wrong reason. But, as we have been reminded,
often the reasons given are more important than the decisions made, and
when covering into the Treasury, or a matter of hours in payment of a fine,
or five hours detention in an anteroom make for serious constitutional ques-
tions in the highest court of the land, there is room for suspicion of the
doctrine.
111, IS Wall. 163 (U.S. 1874).
112. See note 115 infra.
113. Resentencing to the maximum of one year after the defendant had
already served five days, without allowing credit for time served, would have
resulted in exceeding the statutory maximum. The effect of this failure to give
credit was noted by the Court. However, whether there is an obligation to
give credit remains unsettled. See cases cited in Notes, 12 U. of Detroit L. J.
135 (1949), and 45 Mich. L. Rev. 912 (1947). It re De Meerleer, 323 Mich.
287, 35 N. W. 2d 255 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 946, is an extreme
example.
114. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 173 (U.S. 1874).
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under which the petitioner was held being void, the petitioner was
entitled to be discharged.115 The opinion of Mr. Justice Miller
read in part:
"If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England
and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished
for the same offense."' 1 6
"The protection against the action of the same court in inflicting
punishment twice must surely be as necessary, and as clearly
within the maxim, as protection from chances or danger of a
second punishment on a second trial.
"The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for
the same offense, but it went further and forbid a second trial
for the same offense, whether the accused had suffered punish-
ment or not, and whether in the former trial he had been ac-
quitted or convicted."" 17
The fact that it had long been settled that there was no federal
common law of crimes," 8 and that any excess of sentence above
the statutory provision was totally without foundation, seems
not to have been considered or* argued. The case could have
easily been disposed of by holding that: (1) the statute required
the sentencing judge to elect either imprisonment or fine; (2) the
orderly administration of justice required that the judge be fore-
closed from remedying an erroneous sentence after the defendant
had paid the fine and so complied with one full limit of the law.11 9
It was admitted that the judge had the power at common law
(which still controlled this and most aspects of federal criminal
procedure)120 to rectify a sentence so long as it was at the same
term of court. 12 ' But such rectification, the Court said, could not
115. Although from 1789, state criminal cases could be reviewed in the
United States Supreme Court on writ of error, no federal criminal case
could be reviewed directly until 1879, except on a certificate of division of twojudges in a circuit court. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 243 et seq.
(1939) ; Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 109-
113 (1927). This caused resort to habeas corpus in federal courts, and even
in state courts, as a method of correcting errors in federal criminal cases.
2 Warren, Supreme Court in United States History 332 (1926). Ex parte
Lange is the leading case in the development.
116. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 168 (U.S. 1874).
117. Id. at 169.
118. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch. 32, 34 (U.S. 1812); United
States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415 (U.S. 1816).
119. Cf. the reasoning of Judge Hammersley, in State v. Lee, 65 Conn.
265, 274, 30 Atl. 1110, 1111 (1894).
120. Orfield, A Resume of Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 Neb. L. Rev. 251 (1941).
121. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 174 (U.S. 1874). The archaic
"term of court" time limitation was completely eradicated by Fed. Rules
Crim. Proc., Rules 35, 45 (c) (1946).
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increase the punishment without violating the Fifth Amendment.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Clifford was grounded in large
measure on the notion that the first erroneous sentence dropped
entirely from the record when it was vacated, and that the pay-
ment of the fine was completely outside the case since the peti-
tioner made it under a now non-existent judgment. 22 He also
suggested that the constitutional reasoning of the majority would
require that a defendant who was erroneously condemned to death
would be entitled to his discharge because he would be punished
twice to the extent that he had been held in prison awaiting the
reversal of the erroneous judgment. 23
Subsequent applications of the same doctrine are numerous,
and they indicate how far its logic can be pushed. In United
States v. Chouteau,l 2 4 the double jeopardy limitation was held to
prevent the recovery of a judgment against sureties on a dis-
tiller's bond for compliance with the revenue laws. A $1,000 penalty
had been paid by the distiller in settlement with the Secretary of
the Treasury (as provided by the statute). It was held that the
statute intended the penalty to be one of three punishments, 25
and since one had already been imposed and fully completed, there
was no further obligation of the distiller for which he or the
sureties could be liable. In re Bradley.2 6 involved a sentence of
six months' imprisonment and a fine of five hundred dollars for
contempt of court. Under the applicable statute the punishment was
limited to either imprisonment or fine. The error was discovered
on the same day that the fine was paid. The clerk of court tendered
the repayment to the attorney for the defendant upon instruction
from the court that the judgment had been vacated and changed
to imprisonment only. Once again, the double jeopardy notions
of the Lange case were repeated and the defendant discharged.
Mr. Justice Stone dissented, 27 stating that Ex parte Lange should
be re-examined if it was to make a constitutional difference that
the clerk had accepted the money and then tendered it back rather
than refusing it when first offered.
122. Ex parte Lange, 18 Vall. 163, 188 (U.S. 1874).
123. Id. at 197. The argument was made in a later case, and rejected.
See note 38 supra.
124. 102 U. S. 603 (1880).
125. The statute provided for penalty and fine and imprisonment.
126. 318 U. S. 50 (1943). The contempt was committed during a
hearing in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on
review of an NLRB order.




There are many instances in which multiple punishments have
been upheld, even though they involved the same offense. The
most familiar-indeed so familiar as to make citation unnecessary
-is where imprisonment and fine are provided. Normally these
are imposed in the same proceeding. But there are many other
approved combinations of two or more punishments imposed
through separate proceedings: (1) penalties collected in civil suit
or administrative proceedings, with fine and imprisonment upon
criminal prosecution;""8 (2) civil qui tam action by an informer
with fine and imprisonment on criminal prosecution ;129 (3) civil
action for treble damages, forfeiture by admiralty libel, imprison-
ment and fine on criminal prosecution.1so These multiple remedies,
sometimes alternative, sometimes cumulative or mandatory have
been applied again and again without successful challenge on
double jeopardy grounds. The sound rationale is that there is no
question of harassment, no attack on a defendant as an after-
thought, but rather several punishments constituting an integral
whole. 3 '
There is a necessity for re-examining the application of double
jeopardy doctrine to punishment to determine if it is not better un-
derstood when viewed as a problem in statutory interpretation
and control of criminal procedure, rather than as a matter of consti-
tutional limitation. Glimpses of this attitude appear to some
extent in Bozza v. United States,'3 2 where the defendant was
128. Matter of Leszynsky, 16 Blatchf. 9 (2d Cir. 1879) ; Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938). Compare with the Mitchell case, United States
v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568 (1931), wherein constitutional doubts re
double jeopardy forced construction of statute so as to prevent civil suit
for penalty after fine on criminal prosecution. On the other hand in Waterloo
Distilling Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 577 (1931), common law notions
of deodand were applied to show that a forfeiture did not impose a second
punishment for crime.
129. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943).
130. Id. at 556, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
cites these provisions of the Sherman Act.
131. Ibid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter shows the subtleties which the
Court has employed to find that one of two remedies was indeed civil, and
not criminal at all. It would make one wonder if possibly the notion is that
proof beyond reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement once the pro-
ceeding is dubbed "criminal."
The Court has been eager on the other hand, to call added punishments
"criminal" in order to apply the ex post facto prohibition. See text at notes
175 and 190 infra.
One might also mention deportation and disbarment as added conse-
quences of criminal conduct which have been held not to be punishment for
crime at all, and hence not violative of the double jeopardy provision.
132. 330 U. S. 160 (1947).
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sentenced originally to imprisonment only for an offense which
made imprisonment and fine mandatory. After the prisoner had
been in an anteroom for five hours, the mistake was discovered;
and he was recalled to the courtroom and sentenced to both fine
and imprisonment. Dealing with the case as a matter of control
of procedure in the federal courts-any constitutional objection
within de ininintis non curat lex-the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the defendant was subjected to double jeopardy.
To find that the correct sentence could not be imposed would make
sentencing a game in which only society stood to lose. Indeed, there
would seem to be nothing but tradition standing in the way of
having a sentence procedure which would provide for the statutory
maximum automatically attaching to all judgments of guilt after
conviction, unless the judgment otherwise lawfully specified the
punishment. A further indication that statutory interpretation is
the solution lies in Holiday v. Johnston, which rejected as pre-
mature on habeas corpus the petitioner's objection to multiplication
of sentences for a single offense by laying separate counts under
different, exclusive sections of the statute:
"The erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense
of which the accused has been convicted, or as to which he has
pleaded guilty, does not constitute double jeopardy."'133
Another problem arises when multiple punishments are im-
posed through jurisdictional elements of the same sovereignty. It
is paradoxical to continue the explanation of the cases involving the
corollary of the Lanza dual sovereignty rule upon a constitutional
level.23 4 It would seem that the same rationale could as well apply
to any of the several types of multiple punishment provisions.
If the explanation is the constitutional double jeopardy provision,
all are likewise uncofistitutional. However, there is a sound ex-
planation based on statutory interpretation which reaches gen-
erally the same result as the Court has thus far. 35 When military
authorities were empowered to punish by courts-martial under the
133. 313 U. S. 342, 349 (1941), reversing on other grounds.
134. Note 98 mpra.
135. The opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court in
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938), would seem to be predicated
on this theory, at 399: "The question for decision is whether Sec. 293 (b)
imposes criminal sanction. That question is one of statutory construction"
However, the force of the suggestion is reduced by the preceding sentence
which indicates that if both the criminal proceeding for evasion of income
tax, and the proceeding for recovery of 50% fraud penalty are intended
as punishments, then the former is a bar to the latter because of the doublejeopardy clause.
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Articles of War,- 6 the range of offenses and the range of punish-
ments for the offenses were (and are) comparable with the usual
gamut of criminal offenses in the states and indeed in the District of
Columbia. Now to construe the statutes pertaining to courts-martial
and to the District of Columbia, ex hypothesi, so as to allow two
coordinate tribunals to try one and the same individual for the same
murder, and to allow both to sentence him to life imprisonment,
would be stultifying. Consequently the only rational construction of
the statutes is to make the first jurisdiction which attaches definitive
or to give one or the other exclusive operation as to service per-
sonnel. 137 The duplication which may be present between federal
and territorial laws is resolvable in the same way, for Congress
has a supervisory control over all territorial legislation. The con-
trolling test would seem to be this: if the two criminal punish-
ments cover much the same ground, in much the same way, Con-
gress probably intended the two to be treated as alternative and not
cumulative, even though it was not explicit in so providing. On
the other hand, if there is a substantial difference in the manner
in which the punishment takes effect, then there must be a presump-
tion that Congress intended that they be cumulative. 38 If they are
cumulative, then the basic question must be considered: is the de-
fendant being unfairly harassed?
(C) Same Acts-Separate Crimes
One problem which inevitably inheres in the application ,of the
double jeopardy provision is that of deciding what constitutes "the
same offense.""39 Thus, where the Territory of Utah fined and
imprisoned the defendant for polygamy and then prosecuted him
again for adultery with the same plural wife, it was held that the
136. 10 U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593, especially §§ 1564, 1565, 1566 (1946)(Art. War 92, 93, and 94).
137. Cf. Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 724 (1946) (ap-
plying this approach to the Assimilative Crimes Act).
138. Consider lit re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897), which held that
the same contempt of Congress could be punished by (1) a summary con-
tempt proceeding by the House involved; and (2) a criminal prosecution
under a statute making such contempt a crime. However, the contention that
double jeopardy was involved was clearly premature.
Note the shift in emphasis between the Chapnam case and Fox v. Ohio,
5 How. 410 (U.S. 1847), and such later decisions as Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57 (1910) ; Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. 5. 342(1941). The later cases refused consideration of the claim of double jeopardy,
wherever it was premature.
139. By far the greatest number of cases applying double jeopardy
limitations involve this problem. The decisions are collected in A. L. I.,
op. cit. supra note 83.
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adultery was a lesser included part of the polygamy so that the two
prosecutions were for the same offense, even though the proof re-
quired would not be the same. 1 0 Since the double jeopardy provision
was involved, the second judgment was unconstitutional and void;
and the defendant could be discharged on habeas corpus.' 4 , On
the other hand, the slightest difference in the facts required to be
proved makes the two offenses separate so that there is no double
jeopardy. 42 Furthermore, prosecution for conspiracy may be em-
ployed so as to multiply the offenses punishable; but there may
be no double multiplication by charging several conspiracies, where




When a state legislature decides that the habitual criminal is
more dangerous to society and that the accomplishment of the many
purposes of a criminal enforcement system demands that more
severe punishment be imposed upon the repeater than upon the
first offender, is the additional punishment a violation of the double
jeopardy limitation ?14 The question has been decided many times
by the Supreme Court, always in the negative. 145 The explanation
is that there is no further punishment for the earlier offenses at
all. What the statutes merely do is to increase the punishment for
a repeated offense because of the character of the offender as re-
vealed by his violations of the law. Such statutes have long been
140. Ex parte Neilsen, 131 U. S. 176 (1889). Plain statutory con-
struction could reach the same result. It would not seem that the legislature
would intend that a single individual be punished under one statute for
cohabiting with a woman as her husband and under another statute for
cohabiting with the same woman as her paramour.
141. Again Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U.S. 1874), was relied upon.
142. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625 (1915) (where the number
of crimes depended on the number of mail bags the defendant cut open);
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932) (sale of narcotics, not
in or from original stamped package, was held an offense distinct from sale
of narcotics without a written order from the buyer, although the same sale
was involved).
143. Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49 (1942). Cf. Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). See
Ireland, Double Jeopardy and Conspiracy in the Federal Courts, 40 J. Crim.
L. 445-57 (1949).
144. See Waite, The Prevention of Repeated Crime (1943), where
the criminological basis for the recidivist statutes is considered at length.
Many authorities are collected in Comment, Toward Rehabilitation of
Criminals: Appraisal of Statutory Treatment of Mentally Disordered Re-
cidivists, 57 Yale L. J. 1085 (1948).
145. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 (1895); McDonald v. Massa-
chusetts, 180 U. S. 311 (1901); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616(1912) ; and notes 147, 148 infra.
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employed both in England and in America." 6 The constitutional
result is sound; and the principle has been extended even to situ-
ations in which the earlier offenses were in violation of the laws
of another sovereignty and had been pardoned,'1 47 and in which
the earlier offenses were committed prior to the enactment of the
recidivist statute. 14 S Since the objective is to tailor the" punishment
to suit the offender so as to deter one not easily deterred, the crimi-
nal conduct of the offender is revealing as to his character, wher-
ever and whenever it may have appeared.
14 9
An analogous, though more dramatic case, was Finley v. Cali-
fornia,1 50 where a statute was upheld which imposed the death
penalty for assault with intent to kill where such assault was com-
mitted by a prisoner under life sentence. The Court dealt with the
case summarily as a matter of permissible classification within the
limits of the equal protection clause. The real issue in the recidivist
statute cases is the same. Since the discretion of the legislature in
classifying is very broad, it is scarcely possible that an attack
founded upon either the double jeopardy or the equal protection
clauses will succeed.
15
III. Ex POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER
"No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."1 2
"No state shall.., pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law,
or law impairing the obligation of contracts. .... ,,153
The constitutional provisions which we are next to consider
form a logical whole, with a unified historical background in their
original inclusion in the Constitution. 5
In England at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, a
146. 6 and 7 Will. IV, c. 111 (1837); Mass. Laws 1818, c. 176; see
statutes cited in Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 623 (1912).
147. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51 (1914); cf. People ex rel.
Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. 2d 468 (1941), cert. denied,
317 U. S. 625 (1942) (Presidential pardon of first offense, for innocence, in-
effective to bar state punishment as second offender).
148. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948).
149. Such statutes have been criticized on penological ground because
of their arbitrary action. For similar reasons, courts have mitigated their
operation considerably by strict construction, strict requirement of high de-
gree of proof, and subterfuge. See Note, Court Treatment of Recidivist
Statutes, 48 Col. L. Rev. 238 (1948).
150. 222 U. S. 28 (1911).
151. Of course, there is the advantage, where the case arises under a
state criminal statute, that the equal protection limitation of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies directly, while the double jeopardy clause must be im-
ported, one way or another, from the Fifth Amendment to the Fourteenth.
152. Art. I, Sec. 9.
153. Art. I, Sec. 10.
154. In the Constitutional Convention, during August, 1787, it was
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bill of attainder was a legislative adjudication inflicting capital
punishment; any lesser punishment under the same authority was
imposed by a bill of pains and penalties.155 However, since the
earliest decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been settled that
"bill of attainder" as used in the Federal Constitution includes all
such legislative condemnations, whether capital or not.' 5 It has
even been contended that the dual terminology was unknown in
the colonies and that a bill of attainder was a generic term for any
type of legislative exercise of judicial power. 57
On the other hand, the term ex post facto law probably was
employed in both England and America in the sense of any statute
operating after the deed.' 5 The meaning of "ex post facto" was
confused, as the records of the Constitutional Convention show, 59
and it was undoubtedly to remove the confusion by limiting "ex
post facto" to criminal statutes that the phrase prohibiting laws
impairing the obligation of contracts was added to the provision
limiting the States. 60 There have been numerous assertions to the
quickly agreed among the framers that a limitation must be placed upon
both federal and state governments to prevent enactment of criminal statutes
such as the anti-royalist legislation of the Revolutionary period. The divi-
sion among them came on two points: (1) how far retrospective non-
criminal legislation should be prevented to avoid- repetition of debtor legisla-
tion such as was -involved in the paper money craze; (2) whether the
"ex post facto" prohibition would accomplish the desired effect as to non-
criminal legislation. A statement by Mr. Dickinson to the effect that
Blackstone limited "ex post facto" laws to those touching upon criminal
matters, is the only explanation for the addition of the impairment of obli-
gations clause. The author submits that it is impossible to read the entire
minutes of Madison, and to compare the various drafts, without taking away
the impression that the consensus of the convention was to set up an absolute
prohibition against retrospective criminal statutes, ivhile at the same time
preserving contracts from legislative assault, without tying the hands of the
legislatures by prohibiting all retrospective enactments.
2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 368, 375, 378, 448,
617, 619 (1911) ; 3 Id. at 100, 328,
155. 2 Wooddesson, op. cit. supra note 82, at 621, 625, Lect. 41.
156. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (U.S. 1810).
157. Farrar, Manual of the Constitution 420 (1867).
158. 1 BI. Comm. *46, employed "ex post facto" in stating an example
of criminal retrospective legislation. Perhaps it was this statement Dickinson
found, note 154 supra. Madison seemed to be convinced that "ex post facto"
vas equally applicable to both criminal and civil matters. 2 Wooddesson,
op. cit. supra note 82, at 621, 625, in a most thorough treatment of retro-
spective statutes, gives no indication that "ex post facto laws" had a peculiar
meaning. He refers to "penal statutes passed ex post facto." 2 Id. at 641.
159. See note 154 minpra, especially language of Sherman and Ellsworth,
reporting to the Governor of Connecticut, referring to: "The restraint ...
respecting . . . impairing the obligation of contracts by ex post facto laws.
... "3 Id. at 100.
160. The prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts was added in the Committee on Style by Gouveneur Morris after
general discussion had settled the desire of the Convention. See note 154
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contrary even recently, but the settled doctrine is that the phrase
"ex post facto law" does not comprehend retrospective legislation
as to non-criminal matters.
16
1
The scope of the clauses must be observed particularly. The
limitation is directed to bills of attainder and to ex post facto laws
-i.e., to legislative action. It does not relate to the activities of
the other branches of government. 6 2 Especially it does not inhibit
the freedom of courts to alter legal doctrines or to change the con-
struction of statutes. A policy consideration compels this conclu-
sion just as much as does the wording and the history of the
provision.
It is settled, in the distribution of the functions of state and
federal courts-especially the Supreme Court-that construction
of state statutes is primarily the business of the state courtsY.63 The
federal court must take the construction as it finds it. Now if the
Supreme Court, for example, were free to determine that a given
construction of a state statute imposed greater punishment than
would have been incurred under a construction existing at the
time the prohibited conduct was committed; then it would neces-
sarily follow that the Supreme Court could supplant the state con-
struction of the statute with its own.16 4 The result of such a decision
would be a determination that the later construction was correct
and the earlier construction erroneous.
As to the interpretation of federal statutes, there is, of course,
supra; 2 Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution 213 (1882).
Compare draft referred to the Committee on Style with reported draft to
which had been added: "nor laws altering or impairing the obligation of
contracts." 2 Farrand, op. cit. supra, note 154, at 577, 597.
161. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386 (U.S. 1798). Contrary views were
expressed by Mr. Justice Johnson in memorandum following Satterlee v.
Matthewson, 2 Pet. 681 (1st ed., U.S. 1829) ; see also Farrar, op: cit. supra
note 157, at 422; Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Pro-
hibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 539 (1947). Professor
Crosskey unfortunately treats the debates of the Federal Convention only in
passing, although the sense of the framers is contrary to his thesis. He argues
that in 1787 the general understanding of the term "ex post facto laws" en-
compassed all retroactive legislation-both civil and criminal. The ad hoc
restriction of its meaning-witnessed both by the convention proceedings
and the constitution itself-shows that his theory, if correct, is hardly
relevant.
162. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915) denied applicability of
the ex post facto provision to change of a judge-made rule of practice.
163. Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Executor, 5 How.
317, 343 (U.S. 1847) ; Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481, 486 (1908) ;
Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 400 (1937) ; cf. Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562- (1949).
164. Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150, 161 (1913); Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 (1915) ; see Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930)(especially notes 7 and 8).
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no such limitation upon the revision of constructions made by fed-
eral courts so that any disapproval of a change in interpretation of
a statute in a federal court is founded upon the power of the
Supreme Court to correct erroneous decisions and not upon any
constitutional limitation. Such has been the interpretation placed
upon both the ex post facto law and impairment of obligation of
contracts provisions. 165
In the application of the ex post facto provision a more difficult
problem is to determine whether or not given legislation, passed
after the fact, has the effect of making the condition of the offender
worse than it would have been under the earlier law.' 166 There was
a classification laid down in one of the very earliest decisions,
Calder v. Buil,16 7 which is still a leading case. There, Mr. Justice
Chase, who was later to fall under a cloud, 68 set out the following
classification of ex post facto laws:
"lst. Every law that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punish-
ment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th.
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offen-
der.,,16'
This dictum has been relied upon many times, sometimes as being
an exhaustive categorization, sometimes as being illustrative only.
At least it comprehends the most typical laws of that kind although
the validity of the fourth class has become very dubious.
The first cases which involved a full consideration of the ex
post facto provision by the Supreme Court arose in the very con-
text that the framers of the Constitution anticipated. During the
bitter times which followed the War between the States, Missouri
was sharply divided. 70 One of the results of the eventual Union
165. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Refining Co., 125 U. S.
18 (1888) ; Cross Lake Shooting and Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S.
632 (1912). -"Law" has been held in the cases cited above and elsewhere in
this section to include statutes, constitutional provisions, and municipal
ordinances.
166. Cooley, op. cit. supra note 7, at 266.
167. 3 Dallas 386 (U.S. 1798).
168. Impeached by a Republican House in 1803, but conviction failed.
The principal charge was partisanship, especially in Alien and Sedition
cases.
169. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386, 390 (U.S. 1798). This classification
appears to be a synthesis of illustrative acts cited in 2 Wooddesson, op. cit.
supra, note 82, at 631, 633, 638.
170. Bassett, A Short History of the United States 517 (3d ed. 1939)
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victory was the requirement of a test oath, according to Missouri's
newly established constitution. The substance of the requirement
was that before exercising any of innumerable civil and personal
rights such as voting, running for office, practicing law, teaching,
or acting as a priest or minister, each person must tdke an oath
that he had not been a rebel or a rebel-sympathizer. In Cummings
v. Missouri review was sought of the conviction of a Catholic priest
for exercising his office without taking the required oath. 7 1 In an
opinion by Mr. Justice Field the Court held that the provision con-
stituted a coercive bill of pains and penalties'7 2 and was also an
ex post facto law. The argument that the statute was a police power
regulation of professions in an effort to protect the public and the
state was rejected.17 Looking behind the form of regulation to its
intended effect, the Court found a purpose to punish acts in a way
in which they were not punishable when committed.'7 4 The opinion
also noted that in basing the test oaths upon past states of mind,
Missouri had gone further than the most notorious requirements
in England or France.
Decided the same day was Ex parte Garland, a case relating to
the right of an attorney to practice before the United States
Supreme Court.17 5 An oath was required by both an Act of Congress
and a rule of court, much to the same effect as that which Missouri
had required of Father Cummings. The petitioner, Garland, had
been a member of the Congress of the Confederacy, clearly a rebel,
but had been pardoned by the President. 76
The Court relied upon the following reasoning: the oath re-
quired went beyond appropriate qualifications of attorneys; since
the act of Congress was intended to operate as punishment, it was
an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder; since the rule of court
was intended only to implement the unconstitutional statute, it
was improvident in that it emphasized past conduct, whereas the
171. 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867). Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234 (U.S.
1872) condemned a similar oath required in West Virginia before being
allowed to reopen a judgment obtained by attachment without notice.
172. Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 171, at 323-324. Many instances
of coercion practiced by conditional bills of pains and penalties are collected
in Wooddesson, op. cit. supra note 82, at 621. There was a close analogy
between such bills and the practice of outlawry. Respublica v. Doan, 1
Dall. 86 (Pa. Sup. Ct 1784).
173. Dissenting were Justices Miller, Swayne, Davis, and Chief Justice
Chase, all recent Republican appointees. Mr. Justice Miller's dissenting
opinion applies particularly to Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867).
174. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319-320 (1867).
175. 4 Wall. 333 (1867), an original motion for leave to practice as an
attorney of the Supreme Court without taking the oath as to past loyalty.
176. As to the effect of the pardon, see text at note 263 infra.
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truly relevant qualification was future loyalty."7 Furthermore, we
must observe, the effect of such a rule would be to deprive a large
portion of the country of proper and convenient representation in
the highest court of the land.
Four dissenting judges argued that the Court thus prevented
the removal of a disloyal, and therefore unfit, attorney from the
rolls.' 78 Furthermore, the Act in question was neither a bill of
attainder nor an ex post facto law since no "attainder" such as the
common law knew was involved, and there was no criminal trial
by which punishment was being imposed in excess of that which
previously existed.
The net result of the Cummings and Garland cases was to
demonstrate the foresightedness of the framers of the Constitution
in laying down such a limitation to prevent the excesses which
revolutionary strife often produces. They further established at the
outset a broad construction for the bill-of-attainder and ex-post-
facto provisions in order to prevent the achievement by a mere
change of form, of the evil apprehendedY.
7 9
Shortly thereafter, in Kring v. Missouri the Court had occasion
to hold that a change effected by state constitutional amendment,
by which a judicially created rule of law was abolished, to the
defendant's disadvantage, was unconstitutional as an ex post facto
law. 1 0 At the time the offense was committed, conviction of mur-
der in the second degree was an implied acquittal of murder in the
first degree so that a second trial after reversal of the conviction of
second degree murder could not result in conviction of murder
in the first degree. The defendant did not fall within the terms of
the earlier rule at any time, his plea of guilty to murder in the
second degree coming after the constitutional amendment. How-
ever, the result of a long series of trials was a verdict of guilty
of nurder in the first degree (with the consequent death sentence)
177. The petitioner, Augustus Hill Garland, was Attorney General of
the United Statds from 1885 to 1889.
178. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 385 (1867).
179. In contrast with these retributive measures was the provision sus-
tained in Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898), where the defendant
was convicted, under an Act passed in 1893, of unlawful practice of medi-
cine in 1895, because he had been convicted of abortion in 1878. The Court
found (three Justices dissenting) that there was a rational relation between
such past felonious conduct and present qualification for the medical pro-
fession. Cf. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889), holding it not an
ex post facto law nor a bill of attainder to compel discontinuance of medical
practice by a doctor who lacked by four years the ten years practice re-
quired of those who could not meet the new criterion of graduation from
"reputable" medical schools.
180. 107 U.S. 221 (1882).
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after defendant had entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second
degree, which plea was later withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
entered.18
The dissent was well reasoned. The earlier rule was a mere
rule of evidence upon which the defendant had at no time relied;
and the fact that it had been changed by constitutional amendment
did not condemn the new rule when; in its nature, it was not ex
post facto.8 2 Later decisions seem to have departed from the ex-
treme position of the Court here; and a line closer to the distinc-
tion between change of substance, and change of remedy, which
has become familiar as applied to laws impairing the obligation
of contracts, has been established.183
Ex parte Medley'" was the first case before the Court involv-
ing change of the punishment only. A Colorado statute embellished
the death penalty provisions existent at the time of the crime by
adding (1) solitary confinement for a period of between two and
four weeks prior to execution; (2) uncertainty as to time of death
by requiring the warden to fix the time of execution without giv-
ing the prisoner advance warning. It was clear that the solitary
confinement was here intended to be an auxiliary punishment and
not a mere safe-keeping provision. 8 " The statute was condemned
as ex post facto. At the next term a similar contention was made
as to a statute in Minnesota. 8" Here the defendant failed to prove
that it was the intention of the state officers to impose the added
181. Altogether there were five trials prior to the instant review in
the Supreme Court:
(1) Trial, followed by reversal on appeal; (2) Mistrial; (3) Mistrial;
(4) Plea of guilty to murder in the second degree, followed by reversal on
appeal on the ground the prosecuting attorney had agreed the sentence
would be only ten years, instead of twenty-five years which the court im-
posed; (5) Conviction of murder in first degree, reviewed upon the instant
writ of error.
182. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 239-242 (1882). Dissenting were
Justices Matthews, Bradley, and Gray, and Chief Justice Waite.
183. Two years later, Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884) began the
retreat with a decision sustaining, against an ex post facto contention, a
statute making witnesses competent who had been incompetent at the time
the crime was committed; see also Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377
(1894), where the modification was in the personnel of the State Supreme
Court. On the other hand, Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898) treated
as ex post facto the reduction of the petit jury from twelve to eight in non-
capital criminal cases. But again in Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589
(1901), a statute revising the appellate procedure so as to allow an appeal
by the state to the state supreme court, if the defendant appealed to an
intermediate court was sustained. The trend has continued. Beazell v. Ohio,
269 U. S. 167 (1925) (joinder of defendants).
184. 134 U. S. 160 (1890).
185. Compare cases cited note 38 s-upra.
186. Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483 (1890).
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solitary confinement in the face of the recent condemnation of
Colorado's statute. Consequently the Court refused to hold the
statute ex post facto as applied to the petitioner. Certain changes
made in the requirements as to time, place, and witnesses of the
hanging were held to be within the maxim de winimis non curat
lex.
In a later case the Court refused to find that a statute which
extended by three months the period of prison confinement prior
to execution was ex post facto.187 The purpose of the change was
to afford a longer period for the condemned person to prosecute
appeals and to seek executive clemency. Since his position was
ameliorated, he had no standing to complain.
By 1915, twenty-five years after electrocution had been sus-
tained as a humane manner of inflicting the death penalty, the
modem form of punishment had become so well recognized as
effective and instantaneous, that it was held that changing the
death penalty from hanging to electrocution did not constitute an
ex post facto law because the change reduced the severity of the
punishment. 8 '
The interpretation of the constitutional limitation as we have
traced it, thus has led to a moderately definite line between per-
missible incidental changes of criminal statutes and those sub-
stantial variations condemned as ex post facto. It is not surpris-
ing therefore that only two significant cases in this area have been
decided by the Court in the past thirty-five years. One case held
ex post facto an amendment of an indeterminate sentence statute
which took from the sentencing judge the discretion to impose a
maximum sentence less than the statutory maximum.189 The
amendatory act made the statutory maximum mandatory, subject
to downward revision of the sentence by the Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles after a short period of observation. In other
ways the statute worked to reduce the burden upon the defendant,
but the ex post facto operation in one aspect was sufficient evil to
require its condemnation.
The most recent case involving a bill of attainder or ex post
187. Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319 (1905).
188. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180 (1915). The opinion
enumerated the following states which had adopted electrocution: New York,
1888; Ohio, 1896; Massachusetts, 1898; New Jersey, 1907; Virginia, 1908;
North Carolina, 1909; Kentucky, 1910; South Carolina, 1912; Arkansas,
Indiana, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, 1913. Id. at 185, n. 1. Some state courts
have treated the innovation of the lethal gas chamber similarly. See note 25
supra.
189. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397 (1937).
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facto law-United States v. Lovett'9°--arose, as did the Cum-
mings and Garland cases, in a context of factionalism attendant
on war. During World War II, the activities and political sym-
pathies of three executive department employees were inquired
into by the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 191 Subsequently the reports of
those two agencies were considered by the House Appropriations
Committee with the result that an Urgent Deficiency Appropriation
Act of 1943 contained a proviso that no salary or other compensa-
tion for services could be paid to three named persons (except for
services as juror or as member of the armed forces) 192 unless re-
appointed by November 15, 1943, by the President with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.
The persons thus proscribed continued their work in the execu-
tive department and ultimately brought suit in the Court of Claims
for their compensation. The Court of Claims, with the judges ac-
cepting widely diverse reasons, allowed recovery. 19 3
On certiorari in the Supreme Court it was held that the effect
and intent of the statute was to bar the claimants from govern-
ment service because of their political beliefs. 9 4 The substantial
interpretation of the Cummings and Garland cases was continued;
and the statute was condemned as a bill of attainder, even though
the Act in no way pronounced the claimants' conduct criminal. 195
Two justices dissented on the ground that the same result could
be obtained by construing the statute as doing no more than pro-
hibiting payment to the named persons out of appropriations espe-
cially made. 96 They found three serious constitutional doubts to
be avoided: (1) whether the act was a bill of attainder; (2)
whether the power of removal of such executive officers rested in
the Congress or the President alone; (3) whether there was a
denial of due process by discrimination against three employees.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter drew a distinction between the broad con-
stitutional standards of fairness such as due process of law and
190. 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
191. Id. at 308-313.
192. 57 Stat. 431, 450, c. 218, § 304 (1943). Elsewhere the Act provided
substantial appropriations for prosecution of the war.
193. Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945). Four
opinions were written on as many grounds: (1) narrow interpretation of the
statute; (2) bill of attainder; (3) denial of equal protection; (4) deprivation
of privilege without due process of law.
194. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315-317 (1946).
195. Id. at 313-314, 317-318.
196. Id. at 318. Justices Frankfurter and Reed.
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equal protection, and the "specific provisions to deal with specific
grievances" such as the bill of attainder prohibition. 9 7 A flexible,
expanding, substantial interpretation of the former, he considered
proper because terms of specificity were deliberately avoided by the
framers. On the other hand, the, bill of attainder provision was
couched in the narrowest possible terms.198
Nevertheless, it would seem that the position of the majority
was sound even though some technical elements of a bill of attainder
or an ex post facto law, as understood in 1789, were not present.199
The Cummings and Garland cases involved the same ostensible
form of removing an officer from his position.200 No purpose was
shown here to eliminate the targets of the 1943 Act from office
because of incompetence or lack of trustworthiness. Since the
statute, as ultimately enacted, provided for discriminatory treat-
ment, without explanation, it was necessary to look to the legis-
lative background to find the purpose of its enactment. Even though
the only prima facie similarity between the statute and the classical
bill of attainder was the designation of individuals adversely af-
fected, it is difficult if not impossible, in reading the legislative
history, to believe that anything less than permanent removal from
the government payroll was intended.2 0 ' To allow such an evasion
as the dissenters would approve, would be to furnish a method of
197. Id. at321.
198. However narrow the "bill of attainder" provision might have been,
it seems that every bill of attainder must be regarded as an ex post facto
law. Every bill of attainder case up to the instant decision has specifically
treated the act as ex post facto also, and it would seem that such is correct
on principle. The dissenting opinion seems to overlook, in stating that bills
of attainder may or may not be ex post facto laws, the class of bill of
attainder which was intended to make up for deficient proof. Id. at 323. Com-
pare Wooddesson's classification of bills of attainder with Mr. Justice
Chase's oft-repeated categorization. See note 169 supra. Of course, the ex
post facto law provision is broader.
199. Perhaps the grossest overstatement of the dissenting opinion was
this curious position: At common law, the usual bill of attainder was passed
at the request of the Crown. On the contrary, this act was opposed by the
Senate, and by the President; only the House approved it on its merits.
Consequently it lacked one of the essential characteristics of the classical
bill of attainder. Therefore, there was no repugnancy to the Constitution.
Id. at 325.
200. See text at note 171 supra. The provisions there employed test oaths
with which the targets of reprisal could not comply, in order to prevent
recuimntion of official activity.
201. The crucial language of the statute was: "No part of any appro-
priation, allocation, or fund (1) which is made available under or pursuant
to this Act or (2) which is now, or which is hereafter made, available under
or pursuant to any other Act, to any department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States. shall be used, after November 15, 1943, to pay an3
part of the salary. .. ."
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accomplishing the result of the bill of attainder by mere removal of
all hint of punishment from the transaction.
That it is usually desirable to interpret and apply statutes so
as to avoid constitutional questions cannot be denied. Nevertheless,
when a constitutional limitation was directed specifically against the
Congress ;202 when the President had announced that he con-
sidered the statute unconstitutional, but found it impossible under
the circumstances to exercise the constitutional counter-check of
the veto; and when the Congress had announced its intention to
strike at certain persons in the same after-the-fact manner that
the framers of the Constitution feared; then the basis for self-'
restraint by the Court was gone. For a limitation upon the legis-
lature only, can be effectively implemented only by the other
branches of government and by the Court alone can that implemen-
tation be definitive. In such a situation it is not for the Court to
withdraw in deference to the coordinate, popularly-elected branch,
for fear that the interference will subvert the proper position of
the branches. By limiting the legislature only, the Constitution has
made it plain that in this matter the Congress and the state legis-
latures are not to be trusted.
Consequently, we have in this field of bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws a curious inversion. Legislatures have been left
free to alter criminal trial procedure and punishment procedure.
On the other hand the limits of substance of definition and punish-
ment of crime have been narrowly confined; and the legislature
has been prevented from using variations of its iown procedure and
from selecting devious forms of statutory control, so as to reach the
forbidden end of retrospective punishment. Furthermore, the legis-
lature is not accorded the deference generally allowed in all mat-
ters'pertaining to criminal punishment. If there is the appearance,
in substance, of after-the-fact punishment, particularly by statutes
operating against an individual or a narrow class, the Court is
prompt to evaluate all the circumstances to find whether there has
been a prohibited legislative condemnation.
IV. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
"No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. .. ."
".. . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
202. See text at note 162 supra.
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 2 3
Already we have considered in some detail the attempts, by
one theory or another, to apply to the states the specific limitations
of the Bill of Rights, which directly operates only upon the Federal
Government. Aside from the limited application of due process
as a restraint on torture, closely akin to the restriction of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause, such efforts have been singularly
unsuccessful. As an omnibus for federal constitutional restraints
upon the states, due process and equal protection have had no
more success than the privileges and immunities clause. Neverthe-
less, in their primary capacities both provisions have had con-
siderably wider application to punishment for crime.
The normal operation of criminal punishment statutes has long
been extremely discriminatory. The modem notion of individuali-
zation of treatment for criminals, and the necessity for devising
regulatory devices to meet the complexities of modern life have
resulted in a multitude of narrow classifications of offenders and
in delegation of broad discretionary powers to judges and to ad-
ministrators.
We have already seen that recidivist statutes have been repeat-
edly sustained against constitutional arguments. 2 4 And it has
been noted that the Court has seldom found any punishment pre-
scribed by the legislature not sustainable under the circumstances,
save where torture was inflicted or punishment imposed retro-
actively.205 The claim of unfair discrimination has been rejected
time and again. The presumption applied in favor of such legisla-
tion is well-nigh irrebuttable.20,6
203. Amend. V, proposed September 25, 1789; ratified, December 15,
1791. Notions of equal protection are inherent in due process, and there-
fore, to an uncertain extent inhibit the federal government, even though
there is no express equal protection provision in the Fifth Amendment. See
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Amend. XIV, proposed June 13, 1866; ratified July 21, 1868. "Due
process of law" has been analogized to "according to the law of the land,"
a provision of Magna Carta. 1 BI. Comm. *133; Gellhorn, Administrative
Law, Cases and Comments 229 (2d ed. 1947).
204. Text at note 144 supra.
205. Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910); text at note 39
supra; and cases involving ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, Section
III supra.
206. See cases involving allegedly excessive imprisonment, fines, and
penalties, note 68 supra. Double damage provisions, Missouri-Pacific Rail-
way Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512 (1885); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minne-
sota, 218 U. S. 57 (1910) ; and qui tarn actions, Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S.
212 (1905), have been sustained against due process and equal protection
objections.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex tel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942), the
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A further instance of the extremes to which punishment classi-
fication is permitted to go is where the statute fixes the sentence
for escape from prison according to the length of term to which
the escapee was originally sentenced. Thus in Pennsylvania ex rel.
Sullivan v. Ashe,07 the Court upheld sentences of two cooperating
escapees to additional terms of one-to-two, and three-to-five years,
respectively, even though the two had participated in the same
escape at the same time in equal degree of fault. The necessity for
a stronger deterrent for the convict serving the longer term was
the basis for the discrimination.
So also has the Court upheld the indeterminate sentence statutes
providing for prison terms imposed with maximum and minimum
limits set by the judge (often automatically those fixed by the
statute itself) with the actual time to be served subject to deter-
mination by an administrative body. Such administrative agencies
normally release prisoners under some form of conditioned re-
straint involving a parole period enduring not longer than the
maximum sentence set by the court.2-0° Attacks on these indeter-
minate sentence statutes have been based upon alleged violation of
separation or delegation of powers theories, 20 9 on denial of due
process of law, and on failure to accord equal protection under the
laws.2 10 Of course, separation or delegation of powers within a
state government presents no federal question, 21 1 save perhaps,
in an extreme situation wherein due process might be denied by
delegation of adjudicating power to an interested party. -12 How-
ever, such an exceptional situation is extremely improbable where
imprisonment is involved. Furthermore, adequate standards pro-
Court held that equal protection was denied by a police power statute under
which a person convicfed three times of grand larceny would have been
rendered sterile, while similar "eugenic" sterilization would not be applied
to a person convicted three times of embezzlement. While the holding was
on the narrowest possible grounds, the language of all three opinions makes
clear that sterilization imposed as punishment would be very difficult to sus-
tain. None of the opinions treated the instant case as one of punishment.
The opinions of Justices Stone and Jackson expressed conviction that the
state of knowledge of heredity offered no hope that the legislature could
classify with any tolerable degree of accuracy those whose criminal ten-
dencies might be transmissable.
207. 302 U. S. 51 (1937).
208. In 1939, only three states lacked parole laws, but twelve jurisdic-
tions (including the Federal System) had no indeterminate sentence law.
4 Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures 20 (1939).
209. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 (1902).
210. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481 (1908).
211. Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 287 U. S. 346 (1932) ; Highland
Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 612-613 (1937).
212. Cf. Tumey v. Ohio. 273 U. S. 510 (1927).
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vided by the statute can end virtually all difficulty, whether federal
or state statutes are involved.
This type of sentencing procedure inevitably leads to the im-
position of unequal sentences for the same crime. But there is a
rational basis for the differentiation in the social, and indeed the
individual, advantage of reducing prison terms of those who can,
with safety, be released early.213 And there would seem to be no
denial of procedural due process, at least where there is a provi-
sion for the orderly determination of the definitive sentence with-
in a reasonably short time after the term begins.2 14
A more difficult issue, and one upon which the Court has been
far from unanimous in opinion, is the extent to which the defendant
is entitled to be informed of the process and information upon
which the determination of sentence is based. Here, as elsewhere,
recently the focus of the Court has been in distinguishing the func-
tion of state courts in construing state statutes and in exercising
other judicial functions.
Thus, the Court recently held in Townsend v. Burke that there
was a denial of due process where the defendant was offered no
counsel, and the sentencing court erred by misreading or mis-
understanding facts of record which were relevant to sentencing
under Pennsylvania's procedure. 215 But on the other hand, there
was no constitutional violation in Gryger v. Burke, where the
Pennsylvania state court erroneously construed the statute as deny-
ing it discretion to impose anything less than a life sentence .2 1 The
latter case was decided by a closely divided Court, so that there can
be no certainty that states will in the future be free from interfer-
ence in such situations. It requires considerable nicety to draw the
line between a state court's error in interpretation of a statute
and error in its purely judicial capacity. Divorced from recognized
legal theory, it is difficult to see why a court's misuse of discretion
constitutes a violation of federal rights, while error in deciding
that it has no discretion at all is a mere matter of state law. But
here, as elsewhere in the field of punishment, we have another
213. In Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481 (1908), the court dealt
with such a statute as a matter of favor only-particularly since the power
to parole was placed in the hands of the Governor. Parole and probation
statutes are discussed in te.-t at notes 222 and 276 infra.
214. Cf. Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95, 106 (1860) ; Ex parte Med-
ley, 134 U. S. 160 (1890), where power to keep the defendant guessing was
the objectionable feature in ex post facto laws.
215. 334 U, S. 736 (1948).




example of the great deference accorded criminal statutes. Such
deference could not exist at all if the state courts were not left free
to interpret and construe the statutes themselves. Interference with
the judicial power, which operates in the context of punishing a
particular criminal, is more justifiable; for the Supreme Court
thus acts as a deterrent to inescapable pressures on local judges-
often generated by overzealous prosecutors. On the contrary, the
question of how the statute should be read is usually viewed by
the state appellate court, at least, with some recognition that it
deserves detached consideration. Taken together with the fact that
state independence of statutory enactment can remain inviolate
only if the construction is not converted into a federal constitu-
tional question, this additional element of greater probability of
detachment explains the distinction.
At a recent term the Court decided a case which will re-
vitalize the freedom of the legislatures to devise and implement
various methods of individualizing punishment. In Williams v.
New York, 17 it rejected the argument that due process was denied
a defendant who was sentenced to death after the jury which
found him guilty of murder in the first degree recommended life
imprisonment. In fixing the punishment, the judge considered pro-
bation officer's reports and other extra-judicial information with
which the defendant was not confronted and which he was offered
no opportunity to rebut. The sentencing judge stated his conclu-
sion that the defendant was a chronic thief of debased character.
Three attorneys requested clemency, but none contradicted the
sentencing judge's basic assertions.
The Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Black (its spokesman in
many cases on Civil Rights) made clear that the requirements of
a fair hearing on the issue of guilt,218 are far more stringent than
the procedural demands in determining punishment:
"The type and extent of this information [bearing upon sen-
tence] make totally impractical if not impossible open court
testimony with cross-examination. Such a procedure could end-
lessly delay criminal administration in retrial of collateral is-
sues .... And it is conceded that no federal constitutional ob-
jection would have been possible if the judge here had sentenced
appellant to death because appellant's trial manner impressed
the judge that appellant was a bad risk for society, or if the
judge had sentenced him to death giving no reason at all."2 19
217. 337 U. S. 241 (1949).
218. See In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948).
219. Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 250-251 (1949). See text
at note 289 infra, as to hearing requirements upon revocation of probation.
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Nevertheless, the Court stated clearly that the authority of the
Touwnsend case220 was not being sapped.
Due process and equal protection there must be. But the words
of Mr. Justice Field remain today a clear statement of the attitude
of the Court to challenges of punishment statutes:
"The power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a
violation of its statutory requirements is co-equal with gov-
ernment; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether
at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and
what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are
merely matters of legislative discretion."1
221
V. MITIGATION OF PUNISHMENT
A large part of the development of Anglo-American criminal
law during the one hundred and sixty-one years since the adoption
of our Constitution has revolved about devices for mitigation of
punishment. Probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and good-
time credits are new developments. Pardon, reprieve, and com-
mutation of sentence are old methods for allowing a little play in a
penal system once virtually inflexible.
As we have seen, the indeterminate sentence laws have usually
been integrated with a parole scheme of some kind.2 22 And, of
course, there has been no successful attack upon their constitu-
tionality. Although there has been a federal parole system since
1910, the Supreme Court has only twice passed upon it-both
times as to matters of statutory construction. 22 On the whole such
an administratively-managed method of release-subject-to-control
is an admirable experiment. The Court has been ready to encourage
it, wisely recognizing that any judicial hostility would result in
imlosition of rigid sentences of much greater severity. Further-
more, no decision has involved good-time credit, another method of
flexible punishment designed to encourage good prison demeanor.
Since the most serious constitutional issues have involved par-
220. The Williams case, text at note 217 supra, was followed in Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, (1950), which approved a summary procedure em-
ployed by Georgia in determining whether a convict condemned to die was
sane or insane.
221. In Missouri-Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 523(1885).
222. Text at note 208 supra.
223. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. 193 (1923) (denying credit for
time on parole against imprisonment sentence parolee was required to serve
out after revocation of parole); Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U. S. 359 (1938)
(denying credit for time served under a second sentence for crime com-
mitted while on parole from first sentence).
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don and probation, those subjects will now be considered in some
detail.
(1) The Pardon Power
The power of the President to grant reprieves and pardons was
adopted directly from the English system.2 24 There the notion of
pardon had become well established as soon as the blood-feud was
replaced by the "King's peace," for punishment was for the
monarch to impose or withhold at his pleasure. When the sover-
eign ceased to sit in the King's Bench, he retained this prerogative
of extending clemency. Thus, during the period of some three or
four centuries that criminal prosecution by the Crown was a con-
current remedy with familial revenge by appeal of the felon (that
survival of triBal law), the King could pardon the criminal but
could not relieve him of the bot or wer. 21 5 For long centuries the
King's pardon was the chief mitigating force, along with benefit
of clergy, in a strict and remorseless criminal law.
By 1787, executive clemency was taken for granted in the
United States, so that the Federal Convention quarreled little save
on one point :226 there was opposition to allowing pardon of treason
by the President alone.227 Nevertheless, after considerable discus-
sion it was agreed that there was less to be feared of possible abuse
by the Chief Executive (who was subject always to impeachment)
than by one or both elected branches, subject as they must be to the
passing emotions of the moment. The vacillations attendant on
Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts only the year before were les-
son enough to persuade the doubters to enlarge the power of the
executive branch. Public opinion could be depended upon, it was
thought, to keep the President from softheartedness while the
sense of sole responsibility would assure a moderately sensitive
224. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160 (U.S. 1833). There is
a lengthy history of pardon in Occidental law in 3 Att'y Gen. Survey of
Release Procedures 1-53 (1939).
225. 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 54; 3 id. at 312-313.
Parliament, once its supremacy was achieved in the seventeenth century,
also asserted its power to pardon; as to Congress, see text at notes 242 and
262 infra.
226. 1 Farrand, op. cit. supra note 154, at 292; 2 Id. at 146, 171, 185,
411, 419, 575, 599, 626. Of the states represented in the Convention, in four,
the pardoning power was in the Governor alone; in five in the governor and
council; in two, in the legislature. 3 Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures
1,91 (1939).
227. Opposition was led by Randolph, Mason, and Madison. The most
persuasive supporter of granting the President the sole power was Wilson.
A proposal to require advice and consent of the Senate in cases of treason
was rejected after serious consideration.
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spirit of compassion . 2  Thus the clause passed into the Constitu-
tion, after many versions had been discussed, substantially un-
changed from that proposed by Charles Pinckney.
2 29
"The president . . . shall have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases
of impeachment." 280
There being no ready method for obtaining review of a federal
criminal case,231 it was nearly half a century before the pardon
power came before the Supreme Court for consideration. An
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wilson
232
laid down a principle which stood (as did so many of the prin-
ciples stated by the Marshall-led Court) for nearly a century. The
question was whether a trial court could take cognizance of a par-
don which the defendant refused to set up. The Chief Justice said:
"A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power en-
trusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the indi-
viduals, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed.
'23
Such a pardon was not transmitted to the Court with the intention
of controlling its action, but to the individual as the means of his
personal benefit. Especially since a pardon might be conditional
(a practice long approved in England), the individual must, the
Court felt, have the option of deciding for himself whether the
conditions were more onerous than the original punishment.23 4 The
distinction was noted between an executive pardon and pardon by
Act of Parliament. The latter was a public act of which the Court
must take judicial notice.2 5 However, the President's pardon-be-
ing a private executive act-must be proved.
Two decades later in Ex parte Wells, the Court held that a
pardon on condition (by which the sentence was commuted from
death to life imprisonment) was within the historic scope of the
pardon power .23  The applicant argued that the condition was not
228. The Federalist, No. 74 (Hamilton). In cases of treason one of the
expected advantages of such unified power to pardon was the promptness with
which an opportunity of the moment could be seized.
229. The first draft of the Pinclmey Plan read: "Art. 8 .... He shall
have power to grant pardons and reprieves, except in impeachment. .. 
3 Farrand, op. cit. supra note 154, at 599. "For offences against the United
States" was inserted by the Committee on Style, in order to prevent exten-
sion of the power to state offenses. See note 253, infra.
230. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
231. See note 115 supra.
232. 7 Pet. 150 (U.S. 1833).
233. Id. at 160.
234. Id. at 161.
235. Id. at 163.
236. 18 How. 307 (U.S. 1856) (an original habeas corpus petition by a
prisoner convicted in the District of Columbia).
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authorized by the Constitution and since the condition was subse-
quent, the pardon was absolute. This perverse contention was re-
jected. The Court eschewed the suggestion that there was a viola-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine in that the effect of the
pardon was to invade the power of the Congress to prescribe pun-
ishments. Only one justice accepted the prisoner's argument, 23 7
but two failed to find any authority for reviewing a federal criminal
case.
23 8
As might be expected, the historical practice continued to con-
trol the scope of the pardon power. Thus in 1885, the power of the
Secretary of the Treasury to remit fines and pecuniary penalties
and forfeitures was sustained by reason of acquiescence in the
practice, under various statutes, for nearly a century. 23 9
Although the possibility had been recognized before the Con-
stitution was drafted, 24 0 the use of the pardon device to immunize
witnesses from crimination, in order to prevent the exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination so as to avoid testifying was
not considered by the Court until over a century later. An early
attempt (under a statute enacted in 1868) failed because the statu-
tory immunity was not as broad as the constitutional protection
against self-incrimination. 24' But in 1896, in Brown v. Walker
242
the power of Congress to grant an immunity from prosecution,
absolute in scope, in order to allow compulsion of testimony from
an unwilling witness was affirmed.
The separation of powers objection fell because of the historic
function of the legislature in defining crimes and granting amnes-
237. Mr. Justice McLean reasoned that since there was no federal
common law, there could be no analogy between the powers of the king
at common law, and the powers of the President under the Constitution.
238. Justices Curtis and Campbell.
239. The Laura, 114 U. S. 411 (1885). The contest arose on an in-
former's libel to recover a penalty for carrying too many passengers on a
vessel. After the suit was begun, the remission was granted. The informer
thus lost his share of the expected recovery.
240. See text at note 248 infra.
241. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). The prosecution
sought to compel disclosures before a grand jury investigating Interstate
Commerce Act violations, but the statute provided immunity only from the
use of the disclosures in criminal prosecutions or suits for penalty or for-
feiture. The Court found that it would not prevent the use of the disclosures
to seek out other evidence upon which a prosecution for the same crime
could be based. Congress soon broadened the immunity. A week earlier the
Court had held that a pardon after conviction was effective to render a
federal convict competent as a witness. Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S.
450 (1892).
242. 161 U. S. 591 (1896). Here the broadened immunity was ap-




ties. 243 The contention that there might be a state prosecution on
the same matter, which the federal immunity provision could not
prevent, was rejected as too unlikely to be given weight.244 The de-
vice has been employed again and again in aid of many different
kinds of federal controls, and the pardon power of the President
has never been regarded as an obstacle to its use.24 5
In 1915, there was a most questionable decision. In Burdick v.
United States248 the Court considered an attempt to use the im-
munity device through a Presidential pardon. In a grand jury
inquiry into customs frauds, testimony was desired from news-
papermen whose writing had, in part, precipitated the investiga-
tion. The witnesses refused to answer crucial questions, especially
as to the sources of their information. To prevent this retreat be-
hind the privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecuting at-
torney obtained unconditional pardons from President Wilson.
These pardons covered all offenses about which the witnesses
might testify. When the pardons were tendered at a second session
of the grand jury, the witnesses again refused to answer and stated
that they rejected the pardons. Sentences for contempt followed.
In reversing, the Court relied upon an extremely dubious im-
plication drawn from the Wilson case :247 that all pardons are in-
effective until accepted by the person upon whom they are be-
stowed. Furthermore, the Court said that the pardoned person
could not be forced to suffer in invitum the ignominy of the "im-
putation of guilt" inherent in executive clemency. It noted that
legislative immunity, such as had been approved in Brown v.
Walker, carried with it no such implication. Of course, since the
pardons in question stated unequivocally that their purpose was to
obtain the witnesses' testimony, it scarcely seems that there was
any opprobrium attaching to them.
Unfortunately, it seems that the following discussion in the
243. See note 225 supra; compare the Civil War presidential amnesty
cases, text at note 263 infra.
244. United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931) settled the doc-
trine that possible prosecution by a state is no threat of crimination such as
will prevent compulsion of testimony by the federal government. See note
96 mipra.
245. See cases collected at 118 A. L. R. 602, and especially Smith v.
United States, 337 U. S. 137, 146 (1949).
246. 236 U. S. 79 (1915). Burdick was city editor of the New York
Tribune. In a companion case the contempt conviction of a reporter was
also reversed. Curtin v. United States, 236 U. S. 96 (1915). Their claim was
fear of prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States and for
bribery of an official to betray information.
247. 7 Pet. 150 (U.S. 1833). The language of Marshall had gone far
beyond the narrow question of pleading involved in the decision.
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Federal Convention was not called to the Court's attention:
"August 27
"Mr. L. Martin moved to insert the words, 'after conviction,'
after the words, 'reprieves and pardons.'
"Mr. Wilson objected, that pardons before conviction might
be necessary, in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices.
He stated the case of forgeries, in which this might particu-
larly happen.
"Mr. L. Martin withdrew his motion.' 248
Thus the proposing convention foresaw and thought it had author-
ized the use of this very device. Of course, it may be that the Court
indulged the spurious analogy to the Wilson case in order to pro-
tect "the newspaperman's source"-an adjunct of a then-develop-
ing consciousness of rights of privacy and free speech. 24 9 Further-
more, it cannot be denied that such a device for procuring testi-
mony might be subject, in unscrupulous hands, to abuses..2 50
Nevertheless, the offices of President and prosecuting attorney are
essentially positions demanding independence as much as integrity.
It was not long, however, before the Court limited the Burdick
decision considerably. In Biddle v. Perovich251 Marshall's concept
of the pardon as a private act was rejected. Since the President had
commuted the punishment from death to life imprisonment, the
substituted sentence certainly was less burdensome than the orig-
248. 2 Farrand, op. cit. supra note 154, at 426. A thorough examina-
tion of the briefs and opinions in all courts reveals no reference to this
colloquy. It is a cause for wondrous admiration that the framers could have
been so far-sighted in their considerations. Judge Learned Hand in the
District Court mentioned the precedent in 1 Burr's Trial, 244 (Coombs),
reported as United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 55, 63-64, No. 14, 693 (C.C.
D. Va. 1807). United States v. Burdick, 211 Fed. 492 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
249. E.g., Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1890); Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 445,
453 (1915). The argument was made for the defendants, Supplemental Brief
for Plaintiffs-in-Error, pp. 8-23, Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79(1915), but the Court's opinion does not advert to it.
250. Abuses galore in England and in the states are recounted in 3
Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures 1-53 (1939) passim; id. at 81-84.
251. 274 U. S. 480 (1927).
The Government offered in its brief a statement which attempted to
synthesize the doctrine:
"The correct rule is that no exercise of the pardoning power requires
acceptance except a true conditional pardon, which imposes a condi-
tion not known to the law and which requires voluntary action by the
prisoner, but such an individual pardon by executive action is a private
act of which the courts may not take judicial notice, a failure of the
accused and of the prosecution 'to bring it properly to the attention of
the court may make it ineffective, and in that limited way only may it
be said the accused can reject it." Brief for the Warden, p. 7, Biddle v.
Perovich, 274 U. S..480, 482 (1927).




inal. Consequently, there was no justification for requiring accep-
tance of the commutation before the conditional pardon could be
effective. The Court, departing from Marshall's view, treated the
pardon as a mandate to the entire government not to inflict the
death penalty.
It seems that nothing less could have been afoot here than an
attempt to force the President (now morally estopped from al-
lowing death to be imposed by withdrawing the conditional par-
don) to reduce the punishment even more.21 2 To allow the em-
barrassment of an already overburdened Chief Executive by a
convict's "refusal" of a clearly lesser sentence would be intoler-
able.
Another long stride in the advance of the President's pardon
power was taken in Ex parte Grossman.2 13 It was held that even
a criminal contempt could be pardoned.254 Notions of the absolute
sanctity of our tripartite form of government were cast aside. In
an extremely farsighted opinion by Chief Justice Taft the Court
noted that the adjustment of injustices for which the pardoning
power was provided were needed in contempt cases as much if not
more than in run-of-the-mill criminal cases. 255 Where the prisoner
has been held in contempt, it is more than possible that such is the
result of the action of an irascible judge who has departed from
252. The brief for the prisoner expressly stated that the prisoner real-
ized that the acceptance of his contention as to the invalidity of the pardon
should lead to his execution, but strongly implied that if execution were
later to be attempted, his argument would be that double punishment viola-
tive of the Fifth Amendment was being inflicted. See text at notes 106 and
132 supra.
253. 267 U. S. 87 (1923). The language "offences against the United
States" was held to encompass criminal contempt, since its purpose was
to limit the President's power to federal, as distinguished from state of-
fenses, and not to restrict the power to statutory crimes. See note 229
supra.
254. The contrary result was expected by some of the authorities: e.g.,
Farrar, op. cit. supra note 157, at 447. The Court has not yet spoken on two
related matters which are probably beyond the reach of the President's
pardon power: Civil contempt and contempt of Congress. See 2 Story, op.
cit. supra note 23, § 1503; 2 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the
United States 1270 (1910). But compare 1 Kent, Commentaries *284 (Holmes
ed. 1873).
255. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 120 (1928). It is likely that
had there not been a former President on the Court at the time, this case
might easily have gone the other way. It was Chief Justice Taft (then
President) who had commuted the sentence of Perovich, Biddle v. Perovich,
274 U. S. 480 (1927).
The Grossman litigation was of that awkward kind involving conflict
among the branches of the government. Attorney General Stone (later Chief
Justice) appeared as amicus curiae, urging the validity of the pardon. Special




serene objectivity.25 6 Any danger of subversion of the judicial
system was, the Court felt, no greater in contempts than in other
crimes. A general jail delivery would destroy respect for courts
as quickly in one case as in the other.
The executive-judicial phase of the separation of powers prob-
lem was thus disposed of rather neatly on the broadest of grounds
with the pardon power achieving clear dominance. 2 - The other
segment of the triangle-the executive-legislative phase-resulted
in a longer series of cases, fought out in a spirit of great hostility.
This interrelation between the pardoning power of the President
and the legislative power of Congress was the issue involved in a
number of cases arising out of the War between the States.
There were three general Civil War amnesty proclamations.
The first, by President Lincoln in 1863, was conditioned on the
recipient swearing loyalty to the Union and accepting various pro-
visions as to slavery.2 58 Large classes of Confederate leaders were
excluded from the compass of the amnesty. Shortly after the close of
the war a second proclamation by President Johnson was issued.
This was essentially the same, but excluded from its operation per-
sons of great wealth as well as many former leaders.259 However,
specific pardons could be granted to those excepted. The third, most
general, amnesty was granted in 1868,260 but still excluded some
160,000 persons. 261 Not until 1872, were nearly all of the rebels
relieved of the consequences of their treason; and then it was by
256. See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155, 166 (1949) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
257. Conflict of the branches of government as to the pardoning power
may occur in three phases: executive-judicial, executive-legislative, and
legislative-judicial; and in three ways: (1) by two branches exercising the
pardon power, (2) by one branch exercising its pardon power in such a
manner as to trench upon the active powers of the other, (3) by one branch
exercising its active powers in such a way as to trench upon the pardon
power.
E.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 449 (1932), held that
the judiciary could not .na sponte mitigate a criminal statute without inter-
fering with both legislature and executive.
258. 13 Stat. 737 (1863) ; "authorized" by 12 Stat. 592 (1862). The
conditions were modified by proclamation, March 26, 1864, 13 Stat. 741.
The opinions in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (U.S. 1871); and
Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 153 (U.S. 1872) recite the terms of
the various confiscation acts and general amnesties involved in this series of
-.ases.
The political motives behind the proclamations varied with the fortunes
of war and reconstruction. See Bassett, op. cit. supra note 170, at 596 et seq
259. 13 Stat. 758 (1865).
260. 15 Stat. 711 (1868).
261. Bassett, op. cit. supra note 170, at 634-635.
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act of Congress, which removed political disabilities under Section
three of the Fourteenth Amendment.
262
The first issue settled was the. effect of a special presidential
pardon. In a case we have seen before, Ex parte Garland2 6 3 the
Court held that the statute which deprived an attorney of his stand-
ing in federal courts, by requiring an oath as to past loyalty which
he could not take, was ex post facto. However, the Court accepted
as an alternative ground of decision the contention that the require-
ment was unconstitutional because it clogged the effectiveness of
the special pardon which the President had granted. 64 Shortly
afterwards, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified (it had al-
ready been proposed by Congress) with a provision which made
necessary approval of two-thirds of each house of Congress before
a traitorous officer of the United States could resume such an
office. However, Garland was unaffected by the Amendment.2 65
This alteration of the extent of the pardon power as to treason re-
calls the doubts of the framers of the Constitution..2 66 However, no
basic constitutional reformation was afoot. The underlying motives
for the provision were two-fold: punishment of the rebel leaders
and political advantage for the Republican party.26 7
The rest of the cases stemmed from the operation of the
confiscation acts of 1861 and 1862 (which were little enforced
until the end of the war) and the Abandoned and Captured Prop-
erty Act. The Congressional aim here was to strike at the rebels
262. "17 Stat. 142, c. 193 (1872). Still politically disabled were re-
bellious Congressmen, federal, judicial, military, and naval officers, heads of
federal departments, and foreign ministers.
263. 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867), discussed in text at note 175 supra.
264. Id. at 380.
265. Amend. XIV, § 3:
"No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United
States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same,
or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."
Garland's pardon had been granted on July 15, 1865. The Congress had
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, June 13, 1866; ratification was not
achieved until July 21, 1868. The decision was announced in the interim
on January 14, 1867.
266. Text at note 227 supra.
267. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 127 et seq.
(1908). The first proposals were to disenfranchise the rebels completely.
One primary concern was to make the Amendment unpalatable enough to
prevent the Southern states from accepting it in time to participate in the
presidential election of 1868.
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without depriving loyal citizens of their property. The legisla-
tion was both coercive and punitive, and not purely confiscatory.
Beginning in 1867,26 the Court held repeatedly that a presidential
pardon relieved the owner of such property of the effects of the
loss, unless the proceeds had been covered into the Treasury so
that an appropriation was needed to sustain repayment or rights
of third persons had intervened. Thus in Padelford's case, it was
held that a pardoned rebel could recover the proceeds of captured
property just as though he had been constantly a loyal subject. 6 9
The pardon operated to remove all taint of guilt. Shortly there-
after, Congress determined that the spirit of the various confisca-
tion acts was not being carried" out by this interpretation. A statute
was therefore passed which declared that no pardon could be
admitted in the Court of Claims (wherein claims for confiscated
property were heard) as proof of loyalty; conversely however,
the unqualified acceptance in writing of a pardon which recited
that the recipient had engaged in the rebellion was admissible as
proof of disloyalty.270 In United States v. Klein271 the Court held
that such a provision was an attempt to interfere with the functions
of the executive by limiting the effect of a pardon and with the
judiciary by directing the Court how cases should be decided.
The breadth of the Court's decision is indicated in the language
of Mr. Justice Field in Carlisle v. United States:
"... . the pardon of the President, whether granted by special
letters or by general proclmation, relieves claimants of the
proceeds of captured and abandoned property from the con-
sequences of participation in the rebellion, and from the neces-
sity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their
claims. This result follows whether we regard the pardon as
effacing the offence, blotting it out, in the language of the cases,
as though it had never existed, or regard persons pardoned as
necessarily excepted from the general language of the act, which
requires claimants to make proof of their adhesion during the
rebellion, to the United States. It is not to be supposed that
Congress intended by the general language of the act to en-
croach upon any of the prerogatives of the President, and es-
pecially that benign prerogative of mercy which lies in the
pardoning power.
'27 2
Thus, here also, the President's pardon power was held to
268. Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766 (U.S. 1867) (property seized
under Act of August 6, 1861) ; cases cited notes 269-275 infra.
269. United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531 (U.S. 1870) ; Armstrong
v. United States, 13 Wall. 154 (U.S. 1871).
270. 16 Stat. 235 (July 12, 1870).
271. 13 Wall. 128 (1871).
272. 16 Wall. 147, 153 (1872).
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dominate the power of Congress to punish, just as it was later
held, as we have seen, to dominate the power of federal courts
to punish for contempt. Nevertheless, the power of Congress to
exercise its functions other than punishment was held free from
limitation by the pardon power. Once title to land was vested in the
United States under the confiscation acts, the President could not
undo what had been done and in effect repeal the confiscation act
ab initio.27 3 Nor could the pardon extend the two-year statute
of limitations on such confiscation claims."" Furthermore, Con-
gress retained the power to restrict the use of a special appropria-
tion to payment of pre-war claims to those who had actually re-
mained loyal.
27 5
The Court, therefore has accorded to the pardon power com-
plete primacy. Congress and the President, severally, can pardon
without hindrance from any other branch of our government. No
more clearly could responsibility for justice be thrown completely
upon the shoulders of a single branch.
(2) Probation
The modern trend to individualize punishment of criminals
has developed a most flexible and beneficial device of saving the
convicted person from the rigors of imprisonment, provided he
conducts himself properly for a probationary period. The object
of probation is to economize the social loss inherent in the use
of imprisonment. Fanning out over the country from Massachusetts,
the device has received general acceptance.2 78 Beginning about the
middle of the nineteenth century, the earliest and crudest practice
was developed by courts acting without legislative backing. Sen-
tences were suspended, either as to imposition or execution; and
defendants were allowed to depart, subject to continued good con-
duct.27
7
273. The Confiscation Cases (Slidell's Land), 20 Wall. 92 (U.S. 1873);
Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S. 202 (1875) ; compare Osborn v. United
States, 91 U. S. 474 (1875) (where the claimant recouped the proceeds of
sale of confiscated property from the registry of the court of condemnation).
274. Haycroft v. United States, 22 Wall. 81 (U.S. 1874).
275. Hart v. United States, 118 U. S. 62 (1886); Knote v. United
States, 95 U. S. 149 (1877) (held that a pardon could not be used to
obtain funds from the treasury to pay a claim for which no appropriation
had been made).
276. 2 Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures 15 (1939).
277. The first probation officers were volunteers, such as John Au-
gustus, the shoemaker, who, at Boston during the 1840's, undertook to stand
surety for the good conduct of defendants. Chute, Development of Probation
in the United States in Glueck, Probation and Criminal Justice 228 (1933).
1951]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court first considered the practice in Ex parte
United States.278 A federal district judge in Ohio suspended execu-
tion of a five-year sentence during the defendant's good behavior.
The order kept the term of court open for purposes of the case.
The prosecuting attorney objected to the disposition on the ground
that the sentencing court lacked such power. An original applica-
tion for mandamus to compel the vacation of the order was
granted.279 Arguments in favor of the practice were tendered from
all sides.2 °0 In the First Circuit, especially in Massachusetts, the
federal courts had made a practice, for some sixty years, of "lay-
ing the case on file." 2 81
In an opinion by Chief Justice White, the Court unanimously
asserted that the action of the judge violated first principles
of separation of powers.2812 It was for the Congress to fix punish-
ment; and for the President to relieve from punishment. Recog-
nizing that power had been exercised at common law to suspend
sentences, the Court insisted that the practice was limited to judicial
reprieve-temporary suspension to permit motions for new trial,
appeal, and executive clemency. There had been no practice of
relieving the defendant of punishment altogether. It was made
clear, however, that a statute could authorize such a practice, if
Congress desired so to modify the punishment.
Thereafter, attempts were made to induce Congress to estab-
lish a probationary system.2 83 However, not until 1925, was the
Federal Probation Act passed. 28 4 At first it was little used, for
lack of funds.285 No effective system was instituted until 1930.
278. 242 U. S. 27 (1916). The Judge was the Honorable John M.
Killits, and the case has since been known as the Killits case.
279. The mandamus was made effective at the end of the current term
of the Court, in order that there would be an opportunity for the President,
if he saw fit, to grant executive clemency. Id. at 52. Thereupon pardons were
granted to some five thousand such probationers. Grinnell, Probation as an
Orthodox Common Law Practice in Massachusetts Prior to the Statutory
System, 2 Mass. L. Q. 591 (1917).
280. The New York State Probation Commission appeared as amicus
curiae.
281. One of the counsel who offered a brief presenting the views of the
Bar of the First Circuit was Frank W. Grinnell, Esq., whose investigations
of the early Massachusetts devices are set out in Grinnell, supra note 279.
282. Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27, 51-52 (1916). See note 257
supra.
283. The efforts are described by Bates, The Growth of the Federal
Probation System in Glueck, op. cit. supra note 277, at 251. During the
interim in Massachusetts, Federal District Judge Lowell followed the lead
of the state courts, and continued cases for several months while keeping
defendants under restrictions. Ibid.
284. 43 Stat. 1259 (1925).
285. Sutherland, E. H., Principles of Criminology 383 (1947). In
1929, there were only eight federal probation officers; in 1940, two hundred.
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Nevertheless, the courts did occasionally suspend sentences under
its provisions.
The Court first construed the new act in United States v.
Murray.288 After the defendant had begun service of his term,
the sentencing court undertook to place him on probation. The
Court held that power to grant probation was not power to pardon
or parole the prisoner. It refused to believe that Congress intended
by the Probation Act to subject the courts to the task of considering
sentences twice or more on what were, in effect, applications for
parole. Moreover, such belated probation was opposed to the
basic theory of the statute, which sought to permit defendants to
escape prison entirely.
287
Nevertheless, only three years later the Court sustained the
power of the sentencing court, within the same term, to vacate
the original sentence and substitute one of shorter duration. 288
Here the Court saw the action of the judge as correction of an
erroneous (though discretionary) decision rather than allowance
of clemency.
In 1932, Burns v. United States28 9 raised the delicate question
as to the type of hearing that the prisoner is entitled to have upon
revocation of probation. Chief Justice Hughes then characterized
probation as "a matter of favor, not of contract." 290 The Court
found that there were no formal requirements of notice and
hearing. Since the defendant knew the charge, was represented
by counsel, and the court heard witnesses and considered the
defendant's own admissions, there had been no arbitrary action.
But, nevertheless, the opinion said:
"While probation is a matter of grace, the probationer is en-
titled to fair treatment, and is not to be made the victim of
whim or caprice. ' '291
Shortly thereafter, the Court, in Escoe v. Zerbst,29 2 held that
286. 275 U. S. 347 (1928).
287. It is also contrary to the theory of the device to imprison a
defendant on one count and grant probation on another, but the courts have
found that such disposition is a convenient way of adjusting punishment
to suit the necessity of the case. See Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216(1932).
288. United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304 (1931). The term-of-court
rule has been abolished from the federal law as an anachronism. See note 121
supra.
289. 287 U. S. 216 (1932).
290. Id. at 220.
291. Id. at 223.
292. 295 U. S. 490 (1935). The probationer was accused by his father
of drunkenness and forgery. After an ex parte hearing of the probation
offlcer, the judge revoked probation. The probationer was arrested, and taken
directly to the prison at Leavenworth.
1951]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
revocation of probation without any hearing at all was not author-
ized by the statute. But it made clear that the statute and not
the Constitution made necessary a hearing upon withdrawal of
the privilege.
"Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace
to one convicted of crime, and may be coupled with such condi-
tions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose."2 13
This presaged the extreme liberality which the Court has recently
shown toward sentencing procedure, though approbation of a
summary hearing, in great measure ex parte, is less extreme than
this dictum sanctioning total denial of hearing.
Attempts to suspend sentences outside the power of the statute
were continued. The doctrine of Ex parte United States was
applied once again, and the Court reiterated the invalidity of an
indefinite suspension.294 The defendant whose sentence had been
improperly suspended was subject to be sentenced at a later term.
The "term of court" rule was held inapplicable because the sus-
pension was void, so that the case stood over to the new term
as unfinished business. The defendant could not complain about
the continuance of uncertainty because he had made no request for
the court to impose sentence promptly.
A most serious constitutional problem was presented to the
Court recently in Roberts v. United States.95 The defendant had
been sentenced to a fine and imprisonment for two years. The
execution of the sentence was suspended upon payment of the fine,
and the defendant was placed on probation for five years. Four
years later, after due hearing, probation was revoked, the sentence
vacated, and the defendant sentenced to three years imprisonment.
The Court rejected the government's contention that the statute
literally meant that the court which revoked probation could "im-
pose any sentence which might originally have been imposed." 29
The statute had always indicated that the original sentencing
court could either suspend imposition of sentence, or suspend execu-
293. Id. at 492. The doctrine of "legislative grace" is a peculiar notion
to emanate from portals marked: "Equal Justice Under Law." See the
excellent discussion of the need for equality on the favor, as well on the
coercive side of the law in 3 Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures 61
(1939).
Cf. Griswold, An Argument against the Doctrine that Deductions
Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv.
L. Rev. 1142 (1943). As we have seen, the Court refused in the Perovich
case to treat a pardon as a private act of grace. Text at note 251 supra.
294. Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U. S. 206 (1933).
295. 320 U. S. 264 (1943).
296. The position of the Department of Justice had vacillated con-
siderably over the years. Id. at 271-272.
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tion of sentence. If the government's reasoning were accepted,
the effect of every suspension would be to postpone imposition
of sentence. Of course, once the Court accepted the construction
urged by the defendant, it became clear that the only safe course
for the sentencing court and for society would be to suspend
imposition of sentence, or sentence the defendant to the maximum
term and suspend execution. 297
The constitutional issue thus avoided was whether it violated
the double jeopardy provision to sentence a man twice (the first
sentence being valid, and the second sentence being greater than
the first). Here again, Ex parte Lange298 played a major role in
the defendant's argument. Three justices dissented, 29 9 on the
ground that there was no real constitutional doubt to be avoided,
and that the construction, rejecting as it did the literal language
of the statute, would discourage sentencing courts from imposing
tentative sentences. Consequently, a desirable feature of the proba-
tion system of considerable psychological value was lost: the
probationer could not know the probable cost of misconduct. Sub-
sequently Congress, in enacting the new Criminal Code, amended
the statute to agree with the construction adopted by the majority.30 °
It would seem that the implications of Ex parte Lange--even
if that troublesome decision continues to stand-would not render
invalid the tentative-sentence plan if Congress had wished to make
clear that such a device was to be used. After all, the original
sentence never could be final, and the probationer never would
serve a single day under it. The only punishment inflicted would
be under the new sentence, imposed after revocation of probation.
It hardly appears that there is a constitutional right to be free of
two recitations of sentence, when admittedly there is no violation
297. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U. S. 264, 275 (1943) (dissent-
ing opinion).
298. A dictum in United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307 (1931)
had noted the alleged constitutional distinction between increase and reduc-
tion of sentences.
299. Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Chief Justice Stone. Refusing to
accept the construction of the statute which the majority adopted, they
passed to the constitutional issue. The dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 134 (1904) was much relied upon.
Perhaps its vindication in the Palko case, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), and its use
here indicate that the Lange case, 18 Wall. 163 (U.S. 1874) is open for
reconsideration.
300. 62 Stat. 842, 865 (1948). 18 U. S. C. § 3653 (1949) now reads:
"Such probationer shall forthwith be taken before the court and the
court may revoke the probation and require him to serve the sentence
imposed, or any lesser sentence, and, if imposition, of sentence a sus-




of the Constitution by suspension of the imposition of sentence
altogether.
In view of the continuance of the Court's desire to erect no
constitutional obstacles to the employment of flexible punishments,
as the very recent Williams and Solesbee3 °' cases have shown, it
appears that there will be continued leniency toward the various
probationary schemes.
The adamantly conservative position of the Court in Ex parte
United States thus has shifted to extreme tolerance. It well may
be that the refusal of the Court in that case, to permit judicial
creation of mitigating devices advanced the whole process im-
measurably. By placing the responsibility upon the Congress, it
left the development in the hands of the agency equipped to
implement the system with funds, and personnel, and to establish
a uniformity beyond the power of the judiciary to achieve.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion indicates one fundamental difficulty
impregnating most constitutional issues involving punishment.
Formalism and conceptualism still war with analysis and com-
mon sense. Paradoxically, substantial interpretations have been
applied almost constantly to the protections against cruel and
unusual punishments, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws, to
claims of denial of due process and equal protection, and even to
the exercise of the pardon power. On the other hand, it is only
recently that double jeopardy questions have been treated as mat-
ters requiring balancing of interests rather than slot-machine appli-
cation of maxims and precedents. And yet the liberal doctrinaire
which has found its way into many Civil Rights areas has not, on
the whole, been communicated to criminal punishment decisions.
Any loose talk and expansive dicta have been withdrawn almost
as soon as uttered.
It is in the exegesis of the double jeopardy protection that the
Court has been least consistent. There re-examination of the
Court's interpretation is needed, if the constitutional guarantee is
to be a firm barrier against harassment by multiple trials rather
than a technical ground for escaping just punishment. Further-
more, the inferior courts who are required to deal with claims of
double jeopardy as part of each day's calendar need guidance if they
301. Text at note 217 supra.
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are to act with reasonable certainty and with the appearance of
fairness.
This much is sure: today the constitutional guarantees con-
trolling administration of criminal punishment retain an effective-
ness commensurate with their fundamental importance.
